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This essay analyses the shareholder role in corporate gover-
nance in terms of Albert Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyal-
ty. The term 'exit' is embedded in a law & economics frame-
work, while 'voice' relates to a corporate constitutional
framework. The essay takes an eclectic approach and argues
that, in order to understand the shareholder role in its full
breadth and depth, the corporate law & economics frame-
work can 'share the analytical stage' with a corporate con-
stitutional framework. It is argued that Hirschman's concept
of 'loyalty' is the connecting link between the corporate law
& economics and corporate constitutional framework. Cor-
porate law is perceived as a Janus head, as it is influenced
by corporate law & economics as well as by corporate con-
stitutional considerations. In the discussion on the share-
holder role in public corporations, it is debated whether cor-
porate law should facilitate loyalty-promoting instruments,
such as loyalty dividend and loyalty warrants. In this essay,
these instruments are analysed based on the eclectic
approach. It is argued that loyalty dividend and warrants are
law & economics instruments (i.e. financial incentives) based
on corporate constitutional motives (i.e. promoting loyalty
in order to change the exit/voice mix in favour of voice).
Keywords: Eclecticism, corporate law & economics, corpo-
rate constitutionalism, loyalty-promoting instruments
The unhappy shareholder exits only by finding someone
else to take his or her place. This substitution does not
eliminate the impact of exit, but it greatly reduces it. At
the same time, the structure and regulation of equity
markets today overwhelmingly emphasise exit over voice
and this has often led to shareholder engagement of
superficial character and low quality. We believe equity
markets will function more effectively if there are more
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trust relationships which are based on voice and fewer
trading relationships emphasising exit.1
1 Introduction
In this article, Albert Hirschman’s insights regarding
the interaction of exit, voice, and loyalty are used to ana-
lyse the shareholder role in corporate governance.2
Hirschman, who wrote his original Exit, Voice, and Loy-
alty more than forty years ago, has had an enormous
impact throughout and beyond the social sciences.3 The
model claims validity for analysing human behaviour in
a number of different situations, ranging from organisa-
tions through to markets and to states. The model is also
applicable to shareholders in public corporations.4 Nev-
ertheless, relatively few corporate governance scholars
have used Hirschman’s model to analyse the sharehold-
er role in corporate governance.5 In previous research,
shareholders’ exit and voice have largely been studied
independently, without considering the interaction
1. The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Mak-
ing, Final Report [hereinafter Kay Review], <http://www.bis .gov .uk/
assets/ biscore/ business -law/ docs/ k/ 12 -917 -kay -review -of -equity -
markets-final-report.pdf> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013), at 21 (2012).
2. A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Responses to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States (1970).
3. See for an analysis on the impact of Hirschman’s work, e.g., L. Meldole-
si, Discovering the Possible: The Surprising World of Albert O. Hirsch-
man (1995). Albert Hirschman died on 10 December 2012 at the age of
97. See for an obituary the Schumpeter Column in The Economist, ‘Exit
Albert Hirschman, A Great Lateral Thinker Died on December 10th’,
<http://www.economist.com/news/business/21568708-great-lateral-
thinker-died-december-10th-exit-albert-hirschman> (last visited 31 Jan.
2013). See for further biographical details J. Adelman, Worldly Philoso-
pher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman (2013).
4. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 46. The focus in this article is on cor-
porations whose shares are publicly traded. With ‘closed’ corporations,
shareholder loyalty can often be assumed. The problem (see infra Sec-
tion 2) comes when exit is a possibility, which is especially the case in
public corporations.
5. P.C. Kostant, ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Gov-
ernance and Counsel’s Changing Role’, Journal of Socio-Economics 28
(1999), at 204. See for some notable exceptions L. Lowenstein, What’s
Wrong With Wall Street (1988), J.C. Coffee, ‘Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’, 91 Columbia Law
Review 1277 (1991).
111
Bart Bootsma ELR November 2013 | No. 2
between exit and voice.6 For instance, the Kay Review
refers to exit and voice in its analysis of UK equity mar-
kets, while Hirschman’s concept of loyalty is lacking in
the review.7
Although Hirschman’s model has a wide application
range, the statements in this article are limited to the
corporate governance context. The concepts of exit and
voice are linked to theoretical frameworks about corpo-
rate governance. Exit, which Hirschman calls an 'imper-
sonation' of economics, is embedded in a corporate law
& economics framework. Voice, which Hirschman
regards as an impersonation of politics, is connected to a
corporate constitutional framework.8 It is argued that, in
order to understand the shareholder role in corporate
governance in its full breadth and depth, the two theo-
retical frameworks are needed. This implies that the two
theoretical frameworks are combined in an eclectic
approach. Eclectic is defined as ‘selecting what appears
to be best in various doctrines, methods, or styles’.9
According to this definition, when it proves not to be
particularly suitable to analyse certain issues within the
context of one theoretical framework, an analysis should
be complemented by a theoretical framework that is
more appropriate.10
Law & economics is often criticised for claiming to be
the sole mode of analysis.11 Several authors have argued
that there is not one universal theoretical framework for
6. A. Edmans, ‘Blockholders and Corporate Governance’, Annual Review
of Financial Economics, at 32 (forthcoming 2013).
7. See for the Kay Review, above n. 1. See for the use of Hirschman’s con-
cept of 'loyalty' in the corporate governance context, e.g., P. Bolton
and F. Samama, ‘L-Shares: Rewarding Long-term Investors’, ECGI –
Finance Working Paper, No. 342 (2012), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188661> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013), also pub-
lished in P. Bolton, F. Samama and J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), Sovereign Wealth
Funds and Long-Term Investing (2012), at 147-160. In this article, I will
refer to the ECGI Finance Working Paper.
8. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 15-16 describes 'exit' as ‘the sort of
mechanism economics thrives on’ and 'voice' as ‘political action par
excellence’.
9. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, <http:// www .merriam -webster .com/
dictionary/eclectic> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013).
10. A. Arcuri, ‘Eclecticism in Law and Economics’, 1 Erasmus Law Review 3
(2008), at 79.
11. This claim for instance is made by L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, Fairness
versus Welfare (2002) (who argue at 5 that a ‘welfare-based normative
approach should be exclusively employed in evaluating legal rules
[emphasis added]’). See for criticism on this exclusive approach, e.g., L.
Timmerman, ‘Welfare, Fairness, Courts and a Simple and Flexible Pri-
vate Company Law’, 8 European Business Organization Law Review
(2007).
corporate governance.12 However, if we criticise corpo-
rate law & economics as the only or ultimate mode of
analysis, a theoretical framework has to be presented
that serves as counterbalance for the law & economics
framework.13 I suggest that a corporate constitutional
framework can perform this task. Based on the eclectic
approach,14 corporate constitutionalism is not viewed as
a replacement for but as complementary to corporate law
& economics. The main focus of the analysis concerns
how corporate constitutionalism complements corporate
law & economics. Alessandra Arcuri concluded in a pre-
vious issue of Erasmus Law Review that the eclectic
approach is suitable for an economic analysis of law. She
showed convincingly that law & economics scholars to a
certain extent already practice eclecticism.15
In Section 2 of this article, two problems related to the
shareholder role in corporate governance are identified:
(i) short-termism and (ii) lack of engagement in corpo-
rate governance. Section 3 conceptualises the corporate
12. See, e.g., S. Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking
Corporate Governance (2007), at 12 (‘The corporate world is too com-
plex and too variable for any single theory or discipline to be able to
supply all of the answers to all of the problems of corporate gover-
nance. There are aspects of corporate life for which economic theories
are well-suited but, equally, there are other aspects for which we need
a different framework, another option of the conceptual menu. Eco-
nomics can share the analytical stage with other approaches [emphasis
added]’, note that I have borrowed the expression of ‘sharing the ana-
lytical stage’ in the abstract of this article); Timmerman (2007), above n.
11, at 328 (‘[W]e need a corporate law regime that is more than just
economically efficient. There is not one universal model of corporate
law, particularly where the interests and visions of people differ greatly
within our society and from society to society [emphasis added]’),
Arcuri, above n. 10, at 74 (‘[D]efending that the mainstream paradigm
[of law & economics] is too narrow does not imply a rejection of ration-
al choice theory; rather, it is suggested that other theories may well
enrich the analytical apparatus of L&E by offering new venues for
studying problems when the application of rational choice theory would
either be unuseful and uninteresting or even fallacious [emphasis add-
ed]’).
13. Consistent with his professional background as Advocate-General at
Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), Timmerman (2007),
above n. 11 emphasises the role of courts and focuses on reasonable-
ness and fairness in concrete cases. Hijink criticises the striving for rea-
sonableness and fairness as an empty, meaningless goal of corporate
law. See J.B.S. Hijink, Publicatieverplichtingen voor Beursvennoot-
schappen (2010), at 88. The corporate constitutional framework pre-
sented provides – in order to counterbalance the corporate law & eco-
nomics framework – a theoretical basis for notions of reasonableness
and fairness. See infra Section 4.
14. Timmerman (2007), above n. 11 speaks about a 'pluralistic' approach
and Korobkin and Ulen argue for ‘creating a collection of situation-spe-
cific minitheories useful in the analysis of discrete legal problems’. See
R.B. Korobkin and T.S. Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumptions from the Law and Economics’, 88 Califor-
nia Law Review 1051 (2000).
15. Arcuri, above n. 10, at 60 refers to the work of Adam Smith, as cited by
Jacob Viner: ‘In these days of contending schools, each of them with
the deep, though momentary, conviction that it, and it alone, knows
the one and only path to economic truth, how refreshing it is to return
to The Wealth of Nations with its eclecticism, its good temper, its com-
mon sense, and its willingness to grant that those who saw things dif-
ferently from itself were only partly wrong [emphasis added]’. See J.
Viner, ‘Adam Smith and Laissez Faire’, 35 The Journal of Political Econ-
omy 198 (1927), at 232, quoted in Arcuri. Arcuri, above n. 10, at 63-64
considers not only Smith’s Wealth of Nations of value for law & eco-
nomics but his entire oeuvre, including The Theory of Moral Sentiments
and Lectures on Jurisprudence.
112
ELR November 2013 | No. 2
governance activities of shareholders (i.e. shareholder
activism) in terms of Hirschman’s model. The problems
identified in Section 2 are analysed in terms of Hirsch-
man’s model as (i) an excessive focus on exit and (ii) a
subsequent lack of voice. Section 4 explains the concep-
tual differences with respect to corporate law and corpo-
rate governance between the corporate law & economics
framework (with its emphasis on exit) and the corporate
constitutional framework (with its emphasis on voice),
which serves as the onset for Section 5. Section 5 draws
a comparative evaluation of shareholder activism by
engaging both with corporate law & economics and cor-
porate constitutionalism. The comparative evaluation
demonstrates that the two theoretical frameworks high-
light different aspects of the same situation. The theo-
retical frameworks can be viewed as two sides of a coin,
as a representation of the Janus head of corporate law.16
The differences are not black and white; they are to be
regarded as differences in emphasis. To give an example,
although a corporate law & economics framework puts
more emphasis on exit, it is not to say that voice is com-
pletely overlooked or disregarded.17
Once the differences in emphasis with respect to the
shareholder role in corporate governance highlighted by
the corporate law & economics and corporate constitu-
tional framework have been outlined, Section 6 offers –
in order to provide a complete understanding of share-
holder activism – an integrated analysis based on the
two theoretical frameworks. If corporate law & econom-
ics and corporate constitutionalism are viewed as com-
plementary theoretical frameworks, they must be some-
how related. Hirschman’s concept of loyalty is used as
the connecting link between corporate law & economics
and corporate constitutionalism.
Hirschman’s work is hard to pigeonhole. To mention a
few opinions, he has been characterised as economist,
political scientist, sociologist, historian and moral phi-
losopher, but lawyer has not been among these classifi-
16. See on the Janus head of corporate law L. Timmerman, Gedragsrecht,
Belangenpluralisme en Vereenvoudiging van het Vennootschapsrecht,
Wat Moet Dwingend Blijven in het Vennootschapsrecht van de Toe-
komst? (2004), at 12; B.F. Assink, De Januskop van het Ondernemings-
recht – Over Faciliëren en Reguleren van Ondernemerschap (2010).
See also M.A. Eisenberg, ‘Corporate Law and Social Norms’, 99 Colum-
bia Law Review 1253 (1999), at 1253 (‘Corporate law serves both to
facilitate and to regulate the conduct of the corporate enterprise’).
17. Cf. Bottomley, above n. 12. See for the label 'corporate constitutional-
ism' already R.S.F. Eells, The Government of Corporations (1962). See
for voice from a financial economics perspective, e.g., Edmans, above n.
6, A. Edmans, V.W. Fang and E. Zur, ‘The Effect of Liquidity on Gover-
nance’, 26 The Review of Financial Studies 6 (2013), and A. Edmans
and G. Manso, ‘Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A
Theory of Multiple Blockholders’, 24 The Review of Financial Studies 7
(2011).
cations.18 To my knowledge, linking Hirschman’s con-
cept of loyalty to the corporate legal domain is a
novelty.19 The construction of loyalty as the variable
that influences the balance between exit and voice high-
lights the importance of corporate law. Where exit is the
domain of economists and voice is the domain of politi-
cal scientists, loyalty relates to the legal domain.20 Sec-
tion 6 shows how corporate law balances the diverging
interests of exit and voice.
Stressing the importance of loyalty as mediating variable
between exit and voice has important policy implica-
tions. Most shareholders are not intrinsically loyal to the
corporation.21 It is argued that loyalty can be gained
more easily if it is rewarded.22 Corporate law can facili-
tate loyalty-promoting instruments, such as loyalty divi-
18. Hirschman described himself as a 'trespasser' as he delved deeply into
fields outside his own profession of economics. See, e.g., A.O. Hirsch-
man, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (1981).
In a 1993 interview, Hirschman remarked, ‘The idea of trespassing is
basic to my thinking. Attempts to confine me to a specific area make
me unhappy. When it seems that an idea can be verified in another
field, then I am happy to venture this direction. I believe this is a simple
and useful way of discovering “related” topics.’ Quote taken from
<http://www.ssrc.org/hirschman/about> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013). In
The Economist, above n. 3 it is suggested that this 'trespassing' might
be the reason why Hirschman was never awarded the Nobel prize in
economics. See also Adelman, above n. 3, at 613-616.
19. But see Kostant, above n. 5 on the role of corporate lawyers in enhanc-
ing voice and loyalty.
20. This is to say that the legal domain puts much emphasis on loyalty, see
infra Section 6.1. This is not to say that loyalty is completely overlooked
or disregarded by the other domains. For instance, there may also be an
economic case for shareholder loyalty, on the basis of the role that a
long-term commitment by shareholders can have in promoting firm-
specific investments by other stakeholders. Also, loyal shareholders, as
insiders, may be able to exercise monitoring more effectively than out-
siders can. See on the balance between internally oriented and external-
ly oriented corporate governance V.V. Acharya, S.C. Myers and R.G.
Rajan, ‘The Internal Governance of Firms’, 66 The Journal of Finance 3
(2011).
21. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 2 (‘[F]or the typical shareholder,
there is no real sense of loyalty to the company’). Owners of family
businesses are an exception to this point, as they want to preserve the
corporation for the next generation. See for empirical evidence that
family business focus on resilience more than short-term performance
N. Kachaner, G. Stalk and A. Bloch, ‘What You Can Learn From Family
Business’, Harvard Business Review 11 (2012). Furthermore, there are
countries were shareholder loyalty might be more the norm than the
exception, even for listed corporations. See, e.g., on the case of Japan J.
Buchanan, D.H. Chai and S. Deakin, Hedge Fund Activism in Japan:
The Limits of Shareholder Primacy (2011). Therefore, in this article I will
mainly refer to the UK, the US, and the Netherlands. These are coun-
tries with a great emphasis on exit. See for the UK the quote taken from
the Kay Review, above n. 1.
22. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 2. See also Kay Review, above n. 1,
at 5 (‘Incentives matter: not because, as some people crudely think,
financial rewards are the only human motivation – although there are
some people of whom that is true, and many of them are to be found
in the financial sector’); Advocate-General Timmerman makes a similar
point in his conclusion for the DSM case, Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands 14 December 2007, NJ 2008, 105 (DSM), at 3.58.
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dends and loyalty warrants.23 These instruments – and,
more specifically, how they relate to corporate law &
economics and corporate constitutionalism – are dis-
cussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a
summary of the lessons on loyalty-promoting instru-
ments that have been learned from Hirschman’s model.
2 Shareholder Role in
Corporate Governance
In the early 1990s, Bernard Black observed that the
shareholder role was again on the US agenda.24 Since
that time, the discussion on the role of shareholders in
corporate governance has remained prominently at the
forefront. This is not only the case in the US but also on
the other side of the Atlantic. In the US, the discussion
orientates around the concept of 'shareholder democra-
cy' (i.e. shareholder empowerment),25 while in the UK,
the concept of 'stewardship'26 takes a central place in the
discussion on the role of (institutional) shareholders. In
the Netherlands, the concept of 'citizenship of share-
holders' has been introduced.27 A considerable number
23. Although much of the conclusions also hold for loyalty voting rights,
these instruments are not explicitly included in the analysis. I believe
that loyalty dividend and loyalty warrants have additional benefits over
loyalty voting right as they provide shareholders with a direct financial
incentive. In the recent merger between CNH Global NV and Fiat
Industrial SpA, loyalty voting rights were actually awarded. See for
more information the websites of these companies <www.cnh.com>
and <www.fiatindstrial.com> and M. van Olffen, ‘Nederlandse Loyali-
teitsaandelen met een Frans Sausje’, Ondernemingsrecht 67 (2013).
24. B.S. Black, ‘Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice’, 39 UCLA Law Review 4 (1992), at 812.
25. See for a discussion on shareholder democracy, e.g., L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’, 118 Harvard Law Review 3
(2005), S.M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempo-
werment’, 119 Harvard Law Review 6 (2006), and L. Strine, ‘Towards a
True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Lucian’s Solution
for Improving Corporate America’, Harvard Law and Economics Discus-
sion Paper, No. 541 (2006) and W.W. Bratton and M.L. Wachter, ‘The
Case Against Shareholder Empowerment’, 158 University of Pennsylva-
nia Law Review (2010).
26. Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code, first published
July 2010 and last revised September 2012, <http://www.frc.org.uk/
Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-
Code.aspx> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013). See for the Netherlands also
Eumedion, Best Practices for Engaged Share-Ownership Intended for
Eumedion Participants, June 2011, <http:// www .eumedion .nl/ en/
public/knowledgenetwork/best-practices/best_practices-engaged-share
-ownership.pdf> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013).
27. Dutch Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, Second
Report on Compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code,
December 2010, <http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/
download/?id=579&download=1> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013), at 10 (‘As
noted in the preamble to the Code, unlike the management board and
the supervisory board, shareholders are not, in principle, guided exclu-
sively by the interests of the company and its business. For example,
shareholders can give priority to their own interests, provided they act
in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and fairness. This
means that if shareholders exercise their rights, they may still be
accountable. In other words, they still have responsibilities. The Moni-
toring Committee uses the expression “citizenship of the shareholder”
to describe the actual discharge of such responsibilities by shareholders.
This includes, for example, the willingness to enter into a dialogue with
the company and fellow shareholders when the occasion arises’).
of normative claims have been made about the role of
shareholders in corporate governance: shareholders
should act more as owners,28 shareholders should adopt
a long-term perspective,29 and fiduciary duties should
be imposed on shareholders,30 and so on.
Over the past two decades, institutional shareholders
have not fulfilled the promise of their shareholder over-
sight function.31 In the period 2001-2003, there was a
governance crisis after a wave of corporate scandals
involving, among others, Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco
in the US, and Royal Ahold and Royal Dutch Shell in
the Netherlands. The governance crisis was followed by
a severe financial crisis in 2007-2008, which showed that
governance questions persisted. Jaap Winter identifies
two complaints against shareholders and their role in
these crises: (i) excessive focus of shareholders on short-
term proceeds (i.e. short-termism) and (ii) insufficient
engagement of shareholders in corporate governance.32
The two complaints are related.33
To illustrate these problems, I include some basic
empirical facts regarding short-termism and the lack of
engagement of shareholders. In the US, the UK and
Dutch stock markets, there has been a trend towards
shorter average holding periods of shares. For instance,
in the UK, the average holding period of shares has fall-
en from around five years in the mid-1960s to around
two years in the 1980s. Around 2000, the average share-
28. A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial
Industry Entities, Final Recommendations [hereinafter Walker Review],
November 2009, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> (last visited
31 Jan. 2013), at 72 (‘[B]oard and director shortcomings … would have
been tackled more efficiently had there been more vigorous scrutiny
and persistence by major investors acting as owners [emphasis added]’).
29. Kay Review, above n. 1.
30. R.S. Karmel, ‘Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institu-
tional Investors?’, 60 Business Lawyer 1 (2004), I. Anabtawi and L.A.
Stout, ‘Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders’, 60 Stanford Law
Review 1255 (2008).
31. It is important to note that there are different types of shareholders, see
infra Section 3. The term 'institutional shareholders' refers to pension
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and so on. The focus on
institutional shareholders is justified, as these shareholders hold the
majority of shares in listed corporations and manage other people’s
money.
32. J.W. Winter, ‘The Financial Crisis: Does Good Corporate Governance
Matter and How to Achieve It?’, Duisenberg School of Finance Policy
Paper, No. 14 [hereinafter Winter (2011a)], <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972057> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013), at 3.
See on the first complaint (i.e., short termism) also A.G. Haldane and R.
Davies, ‘The Short Long’, 29th Société Universitaire Européene de
Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money and
Finance?, May 2011, and D. Barton, ‘Capitalism for the Long Term’, 85
Harvard Business Review 3 (2011).
33. See also J.W. Winter, ‘Shareholder Engagement and Stewardship, the
Realities and Illusions of Institutional Share Ownership’ [hereinafter
Winter (2011b)], <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1867564> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013).
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holder period was just over a year, and by 2007, it had
fallen to around seven and a half months.34
The average attendance at annual shareholder meetings
provides an indication of the engagement of sharehold-
ers. In the Netherlands, shareholder participation,
measured as the number of votes cast at annual general
meetings, decreased in 2013 for the first time in a num-
ber of years, to 62.7%.35 This was due to the rather low
attendance rates at three Dutch listed companies: KPN,
Imtech and PostNL. Eumedion gives the following
explanation:
The cause of the lower attendance is probably con-
nected with changes in the shareholder structure at
the three companies. Investors with a long-term hori-
zon are inclined to sell shares in those companies
where the (dividend) prospects are poor. In the 26
April 2013 edition of the Dutch newspaper Het
Financieele Dagblad, KPN CFO Hageman said, for
example, that ‘You see a few more short-term sharehold-
ers, a few more hedge funds than there used to be …’
The[se] shareholders may be of the activist kind or
may just have little interest in voting at AGMs. It is
pointed out in the same article, that KPN is one of
the most popular European shares for short sellers.
Approximately 17.5% of the shares were on loan at
the time of the record date for the KPN AGM.
Approximately 70% of the shares that could be bor-
rowed, were, in fact, out on loan at that time. These
shares are usually lent by long-term investors; invest-
ors who generally do vote. The parties that borrow
the shares will usually be ‘young’ investors, who are
less inclined to vote the shares they have recently
acquired.36
Some authors deny that there is a problem of this
kind.37 For instance, Bebchuk complains about a lack of
empirical evidence on short-termism.38 However, he
does not refer to available empirical studies regarding
34. See for more statistics A.G. Haldane, ‘Patience and Finance’, Oxford
China Business Forum, at 30 (2010) and Bolton and Samama, above n.
7, at 3. De Roon and Slager find that the average shareholder period of
five Dutch institutional investors was roughly three and a half years. See
F. de Roon and A. Slager, The Duration and Turnover of Dutch Equity
Ownership, A Case Study of Dutch Institutional Investors, Study com-
missioned by Eumedion (2012). Nevertheless, their small sample is not
representative for all institutional shareholdings, let alone for the whole
shareholder base.
35. Eumedion, Evaluation Report of the 2013 Dutch Proxy Season,
<www.eumedion.nl>, at 1 (2013).
36. Eumedion (2013), above n. 35, at 3-4.
37. Cf. L.E. Strine, ‘One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their
Powerful Electorates Also Act And Think Long Term?’, 66 Business
Lawyer 1, at 2 (2010) (‘[T]oo many observers of corporate governance
– and dare I say it, too many institutional investors – deny that there is a
problem of this kind at all’). See, e.g., L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Myth That
Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value’, 113 Columbia Law Review
(2013, forthcoming), M.J. Roe, ‘Corporate Short Termism – in the
Boardroom and in the Courtoom’, 68 Business Lawyer 4 (2013, forth-
coming) and M. Kahan and E.B. Rock, ‘Hedge Funds in Corporate Gov-
ernance and Corporate Control’, 155 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1021 (2007).
38. Bebchuk (2013), above n. 37, at 27.
short-termism.39 Bebchuk creates a distinction between
shareholder power advocates – to which camp he
belongs – and board insulation advocates. Bebchuk
states that the body of empirical evidence supports his
view that ‘shareholder engagement, and arrangements
that facilitate it, serve the long-term interests of compa-
nies and their shareholders’.40 In Bebchuk’s opinion,
this view contradicts the view of ‘insulation advocates
[who] believe that increased shareholder power, voice,
or involvement is detrimental to long-term value’.41 In
my opinion, the distinction between shareholder power
advocates and board insulation advocates is false. Beb-
chuk refers to loyalty rewards as board insulation instru-
ments.42 In this article, I argue for a more nuanced view.
In my opinion, loyalty-promoting instruments take a
middle-position between shareholder power and board
insulation. In the next section, I distinguish between
different types of shareholders and different forms of
shareholder activism. The key question is which share-
holders are empowered: short-term shareholders or
long-term shareholders. Loyalty-promoting instruments
intend to shield the board from ‘faux’ (i.e. intervention)
voice, while facilitating ‘true’ (i.e. stewardship) voice.43
A recent paper by Fried gives an illustration of the rele-
vance of this context-specific approach.44 Fried demon-
strates that, in the case for favouring long-term share-
holders, share repurchasing is an important factor to
take into account. In a ‘non-transacting’ firm (i.e. a firm
that does not repurchase its own shares or issue addi-
tional shares), long-term shareholders want managers to
enhance long-term value and short-term shareholders
might benefit from what Fried calls ‘costly price-boost-
ing manipulation’ (i.e. boost short-term stock price at
the expense of long-term shareholder value). Fried also
shows that in a ‘transacting firm’ (i.e. a firm that buys or
sells its own shares) long-term shareholders, like short-
term shareholders, may benefit from value-destroying
actions.45 Thus, in ‘transacting’ firms, loyalty-promot-
ing instruments might not have the intended effect of
enhancing long-term shareholder value.
39. See, e.g., B.J. Bushee, ‘The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myop-
ic R&D Investment Behaviour’, 73 The Accounting Review 3 (1998) and
N. Burns, S. Kedia and M. Lipson, ‘Institutional Ownership and Moni-
toring: Evidence from Financial Misreporting’, 16 Journal of Corporate
Finance 443 (2010). See also Haldane and Davies, above n. 32.
40. Bebchuk (2013), above n. 37, at 1.
41. Bebchuk (2013), above n. 37, at 12.
42. Bebchuk (2013), above n. 37, at 18. See also M.P. Nieuwe Weme and
G. van Solinge, ‘Beschermingsmaatregelen tegen Vijandige Biedingen:
Beperkingen en Mogelijkheden’, Ondernemingsrecht 6 (2006), at 220
and infra Section 7.2.
43. See infra Section 3 on intervention, stewardship and ‘faux’ voice and
infra Section 7 on loyalty-promoting instruments.
44. J.M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders’,
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, No. 200 (2013).
45. Fried, above n. 44, concludes from his analysis of transacting and non-
transacting firms that the case for shifting power from short-term to
long-term shareholders is substantially weaker than it might appear. I
would derive from Fried’s analysis an argument against share repurch-
asing. See also A.W.A. Boot and K. Cools, ‘Aandeleninkoop en Waarde-
creatie’, 87 Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 5
(2013) (discussing share repurchasing at KPN, which did not result in
enhancing long-term shareholder value).
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3 Shareholder Activism
In this article, the term shareholder activism has a broad
meaning, as it is ‘representing a continuum of responses
to corporate performance’.46 This definition implies that
– for the purpose of this article – the term is regarded in
a much broader sense than shareholder activism by
hedge funds.47 This narrow meaning of shareholder
activism by hedge funds is regarded as only one type of
shareholder activism.
In order to shed light on the different responses of
shareholders to corporate performance, Hirschman’s
model of exit, voice, and loyalty is used. Exit, voice, and
loyalty are regarded as different forms of shareholder
activism. Other classifications of shareholder activism
were possible. For instance, Michael Porter distin-
guishes between a 'quasi-indexer', 'transient', and 'dedi-
cated' shareholder type.48 Furthermore, Winter identi-
fies three different levels of intensity of shareholder acti-
vism: 'compliance', 'intervention', and 'stewardship'.49
However, as will be shown, these various classifications
can all be traced back to the classic responses of Hirsch-
man’s model.
Quasi-indexers, who are characterised by highly diversi-
fied portfolios and low turnover, represent the compli-
ance level of shareholder activism.50 This type only
undertakes shareholder action to the extent that it is a
legal requirement. Compliance refers to the minimum
level of shareholder activism. ‘Blindly’ following the
advice of a proxy solicitor provides an example of this
kind of shareholder activism.51
Transient shareholders trade frequently and have a
short-term focus.52 This type represents the interven-
tion level of shareholder activism. It is the intermediate
level, which implies incidental shareholder activism.
The necessity of an intervention is mostly motivated by
an opportunity to increase short-term shareholder
value.53 Examples of this kind of activism include the
Dutch cases of ABN AMRO, Stork and ASMI.54 At the
46. See for this definition S. Gillan and L.T. Starks, ‘A Survey of Shareholder
Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence’, 2 Contemporary Finance
Digest 3 (1998), at 11.
47. Van Bekkum et al. include an example of this use of the term share-
holder activism. See J. Van Bekkum, J.B.S. Hijink, M.C. Schouten and
J.W. Winter, ‘Corporate Governance in the Netherlands’, 14 Electronic
Journal of Comparative Law 3 (2010), at 3 (‘Recent numbers indicate
that as many as 70% of the shareholders of Dutch listed companies are
foreign shareholders. This has made Dutch companies particularly vul-
nerable to shareholder activism by hedge funds [emphasis added]’).
48. M.E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in
Industry (1992). This classification is for instance used in Bushee, above
n. 39.
49. Winter (2011b), above n. 33.
50. Bushee, above n. 39.
51. Winter (2011b), above n. 33.
52. Bushee, above n. 39.
53. Winter (2011b), above n. 33.
54. Supreme Court of the Netherlands 13 July 2007, JOR 2007/178 (ABN
AMRO), Netherlands Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) 17
January 2007, JOR 2007/42 (Stork) and Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands, 9 July 2010, JOR 2010/228 (ASMI). These cases are discussed in
Van Bekkum et al., above n. 47.
compliance and intervention levels, shareholders rely to
a large extent on the exit option.
Dedicated shareholders, who monitor management and
have large long-term holdings, represent the steward-
ship level of shareholder activism. This level goes
another step further, in the sense that the engagement of
shareholders is structural (i.e. not limited in time or to a
certain problem).55 Winter’s words capture this
approach well:
The structural engagement is in fact there to add val-
ue to the investment in the long term; it is the crux of a
different way of investing. Shares are held for longer
periods and success is determined on a long-term
basis. Not continuously using the exit option that the
market offers requires greater involvement of the
investor in the company, more understanding, more
information, and exercising more influence to protect
and increase the value of the investment [emphasis
added].56
Thus, stewardship is about engagement of shareholders
with the corporation. An example of stewardship behav-
iour includes entering into a dialogue with the manage-
ment of the corporation. This level of shareholder acti-
vism relates to the voice option of shareholders and
requires loyalty.
3.1 Exit
Exit is the common response of many shareholders in
public corporations.57 Exit occurs when shareholders
sell their shares and do the Wall Street Walk (i.e. vote
with their feet). For most shareholders, selling is the
‘easy’ option, the path of least resistance.58 Blockholders
(i.e. large shareholders) are an exception, as they cannot
readily sell their shareholdings without incurring a neg-
ative impact on the corporation’s market value.59 This is
also why it is argued that some large institutional share-
holders find themselves in the role of ‘reluctant acti-
vists’.60 They engage in activism because of the high
costs associated with selling their shares.61
55. Stewardship has a narrow understanding based on The UK Stewardship
Code, above n. 26. It has been argued that stewardship has its roots in
theology; see, e.g., T. Thompson, Stewardship in Contemporary Theol-
ogy (1960).
56. Winter (2011b), above n. 33, at 13.
57. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 33 and 76.
58. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 2.
59. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Con-
trol’, 94 Journal of Political Economy 3 (1986). See also the studies of
Edmans and others, above n. 6 and above n. 17.
60. This term is coined by Pozen, see R.C. Pozen, ‘Institutional Investors:
The Reluctant Activists’, 72 Harvard Business Review 1 (1994).
61. L. Verstegen Ryan and M. Schneider, ‘The Antecedents of Institutional
Investor Activism’, 27 Academy of Management Review 4 (2002), at
556. See for recent numbers on institutional investing The City UK,
Fund Management, November 2012, <http://www.thecityuk.com/
assets/Uploads/Fund-Management-2012.pdf> (last visited 31 Jan.
2013).
116
ELR November 2013 | No. 2
Exit is strongly aligned to economic behaviour; it is
associated with Adam Smith’s invisible hand.62 As a
corrective device, exit operates indirectly: namely,
through the market, which makes the study of exit the
domain of economists. If shareholders sell their shares,
share prices fall, which would alert management to
problems. The idea is that a credible threat of exit has a
disciplining effect on management, as a share price
decline influences for instance executive compensation,
and makes the corporation vulnerable for a change in
control (i.e. the market for corporate control).63
In one of his later works, Hirschman explains that Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty was motivated by ‘the excitement of
discovering arguments against the axiom that competi-
tion (exit) is the unfailing and exclusive remedy against
all ills of economic organization’.64 Today’s corporate
governance model still excessively relies on exit.65 As
the Kay Review points out, the structure and regulation
of equity markets overwhelmingly emphasise exit over
voice.66 The problem with this overemphasis on the exit
option is that the unsatisfied shareholder is replaced by
another shareholder, which greatly reduces the impact
of the exit option.67 In the literature, this kind of exit is
called 'faux exit'.68 Moreover, the most informed share-
holders are the first to exit, thereby removing voice
from those who would have the most to say (i.e. the
most informed shareholders).69 Shareholders who are
provided with high liquidity (i.e. an easy exit option)
have a reduced incentive to voice their concerns. From
the shareholder perspective, there is in other words less
need for voice when exit is available. Hirschman’s inten-
tion was to bring out ‘the hidden potential of whatever
reaction mode is currently neglected’.70 It has become
clear that, in the context of corporate governance, the
neglected response is shareholder voice, which will now
be discussed.
62. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 15-16 (‘[Exit] is the sort of mechanism
economics thrives on. It is neat – one either exits or one does not; it is
impersonal; any face-to-face confrontation … with its imponderable
and unpredictable elements is avoided and success and failure of the
organization are communicated by a set of statistics; and it is indirect –
any recovery on the part of the declining firm comes by courtesy of the
Invisible Hand ….’). See above n. 15 for further reference to Adam
Smith’s work in connection to eclecticism.
63. The market for corporate control originates from H.G. Manne, ‘Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control’, 73 Journal of Political Economy
110 (1965). See also A. Admati and P. Pfleiderer, ‘The “Wall Street
Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice’, 22 Review of
Financial Studies 7 (2009), Edmans (2009), above n. 6, and Edmans
and Manso, above n. 17.
64. A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests – Twentieth Anniversa-
ry Edition (1977), at xxi.
65. The overreliance on 'exit' was already the case in ‘yesterday’s’ corpo-
rate governance. See Kostant, above n. 5, at 208.
66. Kay Review, above n. 1, at 21, quoted on the first page of this article.
67. In the words of Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 124: ‘Exit, compensa-
ted as it is by entry, ceases to be a serious threat to deteriorating organ-
izations’.
68. Kostant, above n. 5, at 205.
69. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 2: ‘exit, which in the case of a firm
means that an individual shareholder sells her shares before the crisis
becomes fully apparent to others’.
70. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 126.
3.2 Voice
The term voice has by its nature a political character.71
Where exit is ‘neat’, voice in contrast is often ‘messy’.72
Voice requires the articulation of reasons and the
defence of one’s position.73 Voice means that sharehold-
ers exchange their views with the corporation.74 It
involves interaction, a dialogue with the management of
the corporation. Voice can be viewed as an attempt to
change rather than to escape from an unsatisfactory sit-
uation, such as a decline in corporate performance.75
Shareholders can voice their concern in different forms,
ranging from public interventions, such as shareholder
proposals and voting at annual general meetings, filing
shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals, or engaging in
private negotiations via letter writing, meetings and tel-
ephone calls with chairmen, CEOs and CFOs.76 Voice
thus includes formal mechanisms (e.g. voting) and infor-
mal mechanisms (e.g. private negotiations).
It was already recognised that if the performance of a
corporation declines, most shareholders will opt for exit
(i.e. sell their shares). Voice is not a likely strategy for
most shareholders, because they bear the full costs of
these forms of activism individually, while only benefit-
ing from their activities relative to their stake in the cor-
poration.77 Thus, it is financially more viable to exit or
free ride on the voice activities of others.78
According to Hirschman, economists have largely ignor-
ed voice. Their main focus is on market forces (i.e. exit)
while they leave non-market forces (i.e. voice) to politi-
cal scientists.79 If Hirschman’s work is applied to corpo-
rate governance, it is mostly used to underscore the pre-
eminence of the exit option for shareholders, which
explains the absence of voice (i.e. a positive explana-
71. Bottomley, above n. 12, at 147.
72. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 15-16.
73. Bottomley, above n. 12, at 148.
74. Kay Review, above n. 1, at 10.
75. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 30 (‘[Voice is] any attempt at all to
change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs,
whether through individual or collective petition to the management
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the inten-
tion of forcing a change in management, or through various types of
actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public
opinion’).
76. M. Becht, J. Franks, C. Mayer and S. Rossi, ‘Returns to Shareholder
Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund’,
22 Review of Financial Studies 8 (2009). See also Edmans (2013),
above n. 6. Shleifer and Vishny, above n. 59 refer to these informal
negotiations as ‘jawboning’.
77. A.R. Admati, P. Pfleiderer and J. Zechner, ‘Large Shareholder Activism,
Risk Sharing and Financial Market Equilibrium’, 105 Journal of Political
Economy (1994).
78. In the words of Huddart: ‘Effective monitoring of management by
shareholders is a public good whose costs are privately incurred’. See S.
Huddart, ‘The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value’, 39
Management Science (1993), at 1417. In the words of Bolton and
Samama, above n. 7, at 2: ‘The voice response is likely to be personally
costly to the activist shareholder, while bringing uncertain rewards in
the distant future, which moreover are shared equally by both active
and passive shareholders’. This free-rider problem is also discussed in
Edmans (2013), above n. 6, at 5.
79. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 19 puts it as follows: ‘I hope to dem-
onstrate to political scientists the usefulness of economic concepts and
to economists the usefulness of political concepts. This reciprocity has
been lacking in recent interdisciplinary work [emphasis in original]’.
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tion), instead of arguing why generating voice might be
important (i.e. a normative statement).80 However, it has
recently been argued that, while voice is individually
more costly, it is collectively the better response for the
corporation.81 This point is made for the true – i.e.
stewardship level of – voice. Similar to the aforemen-
tioned faux exit, a kind of 'faux voice' can be identified.
This type of voice relates to the intervention level of
shareholder activism, which is based on self-interested
behaviour on the part of shareholders (i.e. maximising
short-term shareholder value). I suggest this kind of
faux voice is also the reason it is sometimes argued that
empowering shareholders is part of the problem rather
than the solution.82 In terms of Hirschman’s model,
exercising voice might result in self-interested behav-
iour on the part of the shareholder if it is not accompa-
nied by a sense of loyalty to the corporation. Therefore,
the next section will emphasise the importance of
Hirschman’s concept of loyalty.
3.3 Loyalty
The core idea of Hirschman’s model is the postulation
of an essentially ‘hydraulic relation’ or ‘seesaw pattern’
between exit and voice.83 This is to say that the more
easily available the exit option is, the less likely the voice
possibility is exercised.84 In one of his later works (i.e. in
an analysis of the radical political changes in Germany
of 1989), Hirschman reformulates his model of the
interplay of exit and voice. According to Hirschman, the
German case of 1989 has demonstrated that exit and
voice ‘worked in tandem and reinforced each other’.85
80. A similar point is made by Kostant, above n. 5, at 211. See for a promi-
nent example of underscoring the pre-eminence of 'exit' in the corpo-
rate governance context: F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Eco-
nomic Structure of Corporate Law (1991), at 83 (‘The greater the avail-
ability of the sale or exit option, the less desirable is the voting or voice
option. .... It is difficult to imagine a more effective exit option than the
market in shares’).
81. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 2. A similar point has been made by
J. Charkham and A. Simpson, Fair Shares: The Future of Shareholder
Power and Responsibility (1999), at 1.
82. For instance, this point has been made by Talbot, who argues that
‘increased shareholder involvement is a retrograde step which will only
exacerbate the problems created by previous governance perspectives
orientated around shareholder interests’. See L.E. Talbot, ‘The Coming
of Shareholder Stewardship: A Contextual Analysis of Current Anglo-
American Perspectives on Corporate Governance’, Warwick Law School
Legal studies Research Paper, No. 22 (2010), at 2.
83. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 34. A.O. Hirschman, ‘Exit and Voice:
An Expanding Sphere of Influence’, Rival Views of Market Society and
Other Recent Essays (1986), at 91 and A.O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, Voice,
and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Concep-
tual History’, 45 World Politics 2 (1993), at 176. See also Kostant,
above n. 5, at 211 and B. Hoffmann, ‘Transnational Migration and
Political Articulation: Making New Sense of “Exit and Voice”’, COM-
CAD Working Papers, No. 47 (2008), at 5.
84. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 43 (‘The presence of the exit alterna-
tive can … atrophy the development of the art of voice’), and Hirsch-
man (1993), above n. 83, at 176 (‘[T]he more pressure escapes through
exit, the less is available to foment voice’).
85. Hirschman (1993), above n 83, at 177. He became already aware of the
complications of the seesaw relationship between exit and voice in
1986, when he noted that exit and voice are ‘two basic, complementa-
ry ingredients of democratic freedom, [they] have on the whole been
enlarged or restricted jointly [emphasis added]’. See Hirschman (1986),
above n. 83, at 79.
This reformulation of Hirschman’s model is also rele-
vant for the corporate governance context. Recent stud-
ies in corporate governance discuss the complementarity
between exit and voice, by arguing that the option to
exit makes voice more effective.86 However, these stud-
ies do not include the concept of loyalty in their analy-
sis. Hirschman introduced the concept of loyalty in
order to understand the interplay between exit and
voice. In the context of the public corporation, loyalty
means that shareholders hold their shares. They do not
undertake any action; they neither sell their shares (i.e.
exit) nor enter into a dialogue with the management of
the corporation (i.e. voice). In this sense, in which loyal-
ty is viewed as the default option (i.e. doing nothing), it
could be argued that loyalty does not necessarily require
an active, conscious decision.
In his original work, Hirschman’s concept of loyalty
already required a rational decision. He referred to loy-
alty as calculated behaviour.87 A loyal shareholder holds
his shares based on ‘the expectation that, over a period
of time, the right turns will more than balance the
wrong ones’.88 In this view, loyalty influences the bal-
ance between exit and voice. On the one hand, loyalty
postpones exit. A loyal shareholder will be less likely to
sell his shares in the corporation. However, too much
loyalty can result in a situation in which the exit option
is ‘unduly neglected’.89 This is what Hirschman in one
of his later works calls unlimited or ‘blind’ loyalty.90 On
the other hand, Hirschman argues that loyalty, by post-
poning exit, activates voice.91 This may save corpora-
tions from ‘the dangers of excessive or premature exit’.92
86. See, e.g., D. Levit, ‘Soft Shareholder Activism’, Working Paper Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania (2013), at 4 and Edmans (2013), above n. 6, at 11.
87. This is what Williamson calls 'calculativeness'. See O.E. Williamson,
‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’, 36 Journal of Law
and Economics 1 (1993). See on this also Kostant, above n. 5, at
234-235.
88. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 78.
89. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 92 (Making it ‘possible for loyalty to
overshoot the mark and thus to produce an exit-voice mix in which the
exit option is unduly neglected’). If 'loyalty' overshoots the mark, it puts
a brake on 'exit', while not activating 'voice'.
90. See A.O. Hirschman, ‘Exit and Voice, An Expanding Sphere of Influ-
ence’ in Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (1992),
at 80-81.
91. It can be questioned whether loyalty really activates voice. A sharehold-
er who is loyal to the corporation has not used the exit option, but this
does not automatically imply that the shareholder will actually use his
voice. He may also remain passive. In the literature, several writers have
made this point. See, e.g., Fried, above n. 44, at 4 (‘[W]e cannot count
on shareholders to be better stewards of the firm simply because they
hold their shares for a longer period of time [emphasis added]’). In the
next pages, I will argue that loyalty is a precondition for voice. A certain
level of loyalty is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for voice.
Loyalty facilitates the voice option, but it does not in any sense ‘force’ a
shareholder to perform voice activities. A loyalty-promoting instrument
is not to be regarded as ‘love for money’, compare the title of a 2007
Eumedion conference on loyalty dividend, Z. Tali and F.J. de Graaf,
‘Loyaliteitsdividend, Registratiedividend en Instititutionele Beleggers:
“Vaste Relatie of Betaalde Liefde”’, Ondernemingsrecht 45 (2007). See
also C. Clottens, ‘Over de Beloning van Trouwe Aandeelhouders’,
Tijdschrift voor Rechtspersoon en Vennootschap (2013), at 7, who
refers in the subtitle of his article – with a question mark – to the 1964
Beatles’ song ‘Can’t Buy Me Love’.
92. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 92.
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Thus, loyalty is to be regarded as the critical variable,
which mediates between exit and voice.93
In one of his later works, Hirschman relates loyalty to
the concept of trust.94 Although he does not further
elaborate on this point, I see two important implications
of the reference to trust. First, linking loyalty to trust
highlights a long-term aspect. There is an old Dutch say-
ing, ascribed to the statesman Johan Rudolph Thor-
becke, that trust comes on foot but leaves on horseback.
Where exit relates to the short term (i.e. the focus on
market liquidity), exercising voice requires building a
long-term relationship between the shareholder and the
corporation.95 A shareholder will not engage in a mean-
ingful dialogue with the management of the corporation
(i.e. voice) if he is ready to sell his shares (i.e. exit) and
does not feel attached to the corporation (i.e. loyalty).
Second, the reference to trust highlights the psychologi-
cal dimension of the concept of loyalty.96 Where exit and
voice in essence represent shareholder activities (i.e. sell-
ing of shares and engaging in a dialogue with the corpo-
ration), loyalty is passive (i.e. holding of shares; non-exit
and non-voice). However, loyalty implies more than a
passive shareholder attitude. The psychological dimen-
sion of the concept of loyalty is regarded as the mental
state of a shareholder feeling attached to the corpora-
tion.97 It has been argued that in the case of a decline in
corporate performance, a shareholder with a sense of
loyalty is likely to exhibit behaviour in line with his role
as owner (i.e. psychological ownership98) with an inter-
est in the corporation’s long-term performance rather
than purely short-term financial benefits.99
In the literature, loyalty has never received the same
prominence as exit and voice.100 In the corporate gover-
nance context, I would propose to enhance loyalty. In
93. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 2.
94. Hirschman (1992), above n. 90, at 80-81 (‘I stressed the value of loyal-
ty as a factor that might delay overrapid exit. … This argument could
be formulated in terms of the concept of trust. Absence of trust would
make for excessive instability through massive desertions from organi-
zations whose performance is declining. The presence of trust would
counteract such instability; provided … that is it not unlimited or
“blind”, it will help to enlist the voice of the organization’s members in
the tasks of recovery and reform’). In this respect, Hirschman refers to
an early work on trust by B. Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust
(1983). See also Williamson, above n. 87, at 461, with reference to
Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
95. More recently, the reference to trust has been made in the Kay Review,
above n. 1, at 21: ‘We believe equity markets will function more effec-
tively if there are more trust relationships which are based on voice and
fewer trading relationships emphasising exit [emphasis added]’, and by
Fox and Lorsch: ‘separating long-haul shareholders from the rest could
enable more communication and trust between them and boards and
managers [emphasis added]’. See J. Fox and J.W. Lorsch, ‘What Good
Are Shareholders?’, 90 Harvard Business Review 48-57 (2012).
96. See on the psychological foundations of trust, e.g., J.A. Simpson, ‘Psy-
chological Foundations of Trust’, 16 Current Directions in Psychological
Science 5 (2007).
97. K. Sikavica and A. Hillman, ‘Towards a Behavioral Theory of Corporate
Ownership and Shareholder Activism’, Academy of Management Annu-
al Meeting Proceedings (2008).
98. The term ‘psychological ownership’ is explained further in Section 5.
99. Sikavica and Hillman (2008), above n. 97, at 15.
100. In this respect, it is telling that the German translation of Hirschman’s
book from 1974 already omits ‘loyalty’ from the title, making it simply
Abwanderung und Widerspruch. See Hoffmann, above n. 83, at 6.
recent years, we have seen initiatives that intend to
stimulate a more long-term orientation of directors,
such as lengthening vesting periods of share options and
introducing claw-back provisions into executive com-
pensation.101 However, as has been argued in the litera-
ture, such measures will only prove effective if there is
alignment with the time horizon of shareholders.102 The
introduction of loyalty-promoting instruments could be
helpful for inducing a more long-term commitment on
the part of shareholders.
In corporate law literature, the mixed character of the
concept of loyalty (i.e. postponing exit as well as facili-
tating voice) is not always recognised. For instance,
Michael Schouten focuses on a potential downside of
stimulating loyalty that has received little attention, i.e.
its reduction of the threat of exit.103 Schouten refers to
the following quote of Hirschman:
Loyalty-promoting institutions and devices are not
only uninterested in stimulating voice at the expense
of exit: indeed they are often meant to repress voice
alongside exit. While feedback through exit or voice
is in the long-run interest of organization managers,
their short run interest is to entrench themselves and
to enhance their freedom to act as they wish, unmo-
lested as far as possible by either desertions or com-
plaints of members.104
However, loyalty has not only a downside. Hirschman
argues on the same page in his book that loyalty may
also strengthen voice.105 I suggest that a certain level of
loyalty – in the aforementioned sense of facilitating
voice – seems necessary for shareholders to become
engaged with the corporation they invest in.106 A certain
level of loyalty, presumed that it is not unlimited or
blind107, is a precondition for voice.108 I propose that
instruments that intend to stimulate long-term (loyal)
101. See for the legal regime for claw-back provisions in the Netherlands:
Parliamentary Proceedings II, 32 512.
102. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7. See on the short-termist pressure of
shareholders Haldane and Davies, above n. 32, and Barton, above n.
32.
103. See M.C. Schouten, ‘What Albert Hirschman Would Have Thought of
“Loyalty Dividend”’, The Defining Tension, No. 181 (2010), <http://
www .thedefiningtension .com/ 2010/ 11/ no -181 -what -albert -
hirschmann-would-have-thought-of-loyalty-dividend-.html> (last vis-
ited 31 Jan. 2013). See also M.C. Schouten, ‘Why Governance Might
Work in Mutual Funds’, in The Decoupling of Voting and Economic
Ownership (2012), at 210-211.
104. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 92-93.
105. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 92 (‘Loyalty has … been hailed as a
force which, in the act of postponing exit, strengthens voice and may
thus save firms and organizations from the dangers of excessive or pre-
mature exit’).
106. In the words of Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 77: ‘[T]he likelihood
of voice increases with the degree of loyalty.’
107. Hirschman (1992), above n. 90. If loyalty is ‘blind’, the threat of exit, to
which Schouten, above n. 103 refers, becomes implausible.
108. European Commission, ‘Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance
Framework’, April 2011, COM (2011) 164 final, at 11 (‘Shareholder
engagement is generally understood … as an activity which improves
long-term returns to shareholders. Therefore the Commission believes
that it is primarily long-term investors who have an interest in engage-
ment’). See also Winter (2011b), above n. 33, who states that share-
holder engagement and short-termism are related.
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share ownership, such as loyalty dividend and loyalty
warrants, should be assessed as instruments that may
enhance loyalty and influence the balance between exit
and voice in favour of voice.
It is important to note that not all shareholders partici-
pate in the corporation in the same way.109 In the afore-
mentioned article on the radical political changes in
Germany of 1989, Hirschman complicates the assump-
tion that at any one time all members of an organisation
should have the same degree of loyalty. He imagines an
organisation with two very different kinds of members:
those with a high degree of loyalty and those with little
or none. He argues that both types will react differently
to a deterioration: ‘those who are unburdened by feel-
ings of loyalty will be prone to exit, while the loyalists
will resort to voice’.110 With reference to Hirschman’s
German background, the former are characterised as the
Ausreiser and the latter as the Bleiber.111 Loyalty-pro-
moting instruments intend to influence the balance
between the Ausreiser (i.e. in the corporate governance
context: short-term speculators) and Bleiber (i.e. buy-
and-hold investors) in favour of the Bleiber.112 The loy-





It has already been mentioned in the introduction that
exit is linked to a corporate law & economics framework
and voice to a corporate constitutional framework. This
section elaborates on these two theoretical frameworks.
4.1 Theoretical Frameworks
4.1.1 Corporate Law & Economics
Corporate law & economics is defined as the application
of economic analysis to corporate law.113 In the corpo-
rate governance context, law & economics has to be
regarded as the mainstream framework.114 The term
109. Bottomley, above n. 12, at 14 (‘I argue that corporate constitutionalism
does not mean that each and every member must participate in the cor-
poration, and nor does each participating member need to do this in the
same way’).
110. Hirschman (1993), above n. 83, at 197-198.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Fox and Lorsch, above n. 95, at 51 (‘To provide adequate liq-
uidity, an asset market needs lots of fickle short-term speculators. A
market composed solely of buy-and-hold investors wouldn’t be very
useful. But a market composed mostly of short-termers presents its own
problems. And short-termers have been taking over the stock market’).
113. Law & economics in general is defined as the economic analysis to any
area of law. See Arcuri, above n. 10, at 60.
114. See, e.g., D.M. Branson, ‘Corporate Governance “Reform” and the
New Corporate Social Responsibility’, 62 University of Pittsburgh Law
Review (2001), at 619 (‘Particularly in the corporate field, law and eco-
nomics came to primacy. … Every book and journal article in the corpo-
rate law field had to take an economics of law perspective if they were
to succeed in the marketplace of ideas’).
'mainstream' is used here to present law & economics as
the prevailing corporate governance framework, as com-
pared with other theoretical frameworks, such as corpo-
rate constitutionalism.
Within the law & economics framework, it is also possi-
ble to draw a divide between mainstream and 'hetero-
dox'.115 Mainstream corporate law & economics is roo-
ted in agency theory.116 An agency relationship is
defined as ‘a contract under which one or more persons
– the principal(s) – engage another person – the agent –
to perform some services on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision-making authority to the
agent’.117 The relationship between the shareholders
and the management of a corporation fits the definition
of a pure agency relationship.118 A contractual relation-
ship in which the agent (i.e. management) promises per-
formance to the principal (i.e. shareholders) is subject to
an agency problem (i.e. a potential conflict of interest
between the agent and the principal).119 In comparing
corporate law & economics with corporate constitution-
alism, reference is made to mainstream corporate law &
economics. To be sure, the article argues for a hetero-
dox law & economics, which is open to corporate consti-
tutional considerations.
4.1.2 Corporate Constitutionalism
As the meaning of 'corporate constitutionalism' might be
less obvious than corporate law & economics, I will elab-
orate briefly on this term. Constitutionalism is not used
in the formal or technical sense with which constitution-
al lawyers are familiar.120 Constitutionalism is intended
to draw attention to the political character of corpora-
tions. A corporation is a ‘body politic’ as it embodies a
governance system.121 Furthermore, constitutionalism
draws attention to the observation that the institutional
structures of public corporations appear to converge in
notable ways with the institutional structures of public
115. Arcuri, above n. 10, at 60 formulates 'mainstream' as based on neo-
classical economics, with its emphasis on rationally behaving actors and
focus on welfare maximisation, while she refers to 'heterodox' as open
to pluralism in relation to the techniques of inquiry.
116. M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 4 (1976), at 310, E.F. Fama and M.C. Jensen, ‘Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 2
(1983), and K.M. Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and
Review’, 14 Academy of Management Review 1 (1989).
117. Jensen and Meckling, above n. 116, at 308.
118. Jensen and Meckling, above n. 116, at 309. It is questionable whether
this is a purely ‘positive’ claim, see infra Section 7.
119. E.F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, 88 Journal of
Political Economy 2 (1980), and R.R. Kraakman, P.L. Davies, H. Hans-
mann, G. Hertig, K.J. Hopt, H. Kanda and E.B. Rock, The Anatomy of
Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach (2009), at 35.
120. Bottomley above n. 12, at 15.
121. Bottomley above n. 12, at 12. See already Eells (1962), above n. 17, at
10, and J. Pound, ‘The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Gover-
nance and Corporate Control’, 68 New York University Law Review
1003 (1993).
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government.122 The term 'corporate governance' origi-
nally derives from an analogy between public govern-
ment (the government of states) and the government of
corporations.123 Many corporate law concepts thus have
a constitutional connotation. Over time, a number of
corporate legal scholars have referred to this constitu-
tional character of corporate governance and corporate
law.124 With regard to the role of shareholders in corpo-
rate governance, shareholder democracy and citizenship
of shareholders have already been mentioned. Other
examples include human rights of shareholders,125 pro-
tection of minority shareholders,126 and equal treatment
of shareholders.127
Although some striking similarities exist between corpo-
rate governance and public governance,128 both ‘politi-
122. See on this C. Coglianese, ‘Legitimacy and Corporate Governance’, 32
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 159-167 (2007). See for a criticism
on the comparison between corporate governance and public gover-
nance U. Rodrigues, ‘The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and
Civic Democracy’, 63 Washington and Lee Law Review, 1389-1406
(2006).
123. M. Becht, P. Bolton and A. Roëll, ‘Corporate Law and Governance’, in
A.M. Polinksy and S. Shavell (eds.), Handbook of Law and Economics 2
(2007), at 834. Richard Eells is regarded as the first author who used
the term 'corporate governance' to denote ‘the structure and function-
ing of the corporate polity’. R.S.F. Eells, The Meaning of Modern Busi-
ness: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise
(1960), at 108. See for the evolution of vocabularies of corporate gov-
ernance W. Ocasio and J. Joseph, ‘Cultural Adaptation and Institutional
Change: The Evolution of Vocabularies of Corporate Governance,
1972-2003’, 33 Poetics 163-178 (2003).
124. See for some notable examples A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property (1932), at 357 (‘The law of cor-
porations … might well be considered as a potential constitutional law
for the new economic state ….’), M.A. Eisenberg, ‘The Legal Roles of
Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking’,
5 California Law Review 1 (1969), at 4 (‘Corporate law is constitutional
law; that is, its dominant function is to regulate the manner in which
the corporate institution is constituted, to define the relative rights and
duties of those participating in the institution, and to delimit the powers
of the institutions vis-à-vis the external world’), R.B. Thompson, ‘Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law’, 84
Georgetown Law Journal 1 (1995), at 1 (‘In corporations, the most
common collective entity in the private sphere, a parallel allocation [of
power as in the public sphere] must be made. In this sense, corporate
law is properly termed constitutional law’).
125. Art. 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (protection of property) pro-
vides a salient example, as share ownership falls within the protection of
this article. ECHR, 25 July 2002, JOR, at 111 (2003), and ECHR 7
November 2002, JOR, at 112 (2002). See on this Timmerman (2007),
above n. 11, at 332. See also A.J.P Schild, De Invloed van het EVRM op
het Ondernemingsrecht (2012).
126. See, e.g., Branson, above n. 114, at 621 (‘Corporate law is like constitu-
tional law with a small ‘c’ …. Just as the Bill of Rights protects minorities
from the tyranny of the majority, corporate law sets limits upon how far
a majority may impose its will upon the minority’), and A. Chander,
‘Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise’, 113 The Yale Law Journal
(2003), at 119 (‘Both corporate law and constitutional law seek to order
relations between heterogeneous persons who hold stakes in a shared
enterprise’).
127. In earlier work, I have used the decision model developed by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in cases on discrimination (i.e. cases with a consti-
tutional connotation) as a source of inspiration for assessing the princi-
ple of equal treatment of shareholders in corporate law. See A.A. Boots-
ma, Financiële Prikkels voor Aandeelhouders (2011).
128. Not only with respect to the role of shareholders as emphasised in this
article but also in a broader sense. Think for instance of the 'checks and
balances' that exist between management, board of directors, and gen-
eral meetings of shareholders, which make us think of the separation of
powers as formulated by Montesquieu.
cal’ systems differ in many significant ways.129 For that
reason, corporations are regarded as political entities in
their own right, as also indicated by the adjective ‘corpo-
rate’ in corporate constitutionalism.130 This implies that
within the corporate context, constitutional values and
ideas may have applications and consequences different
than in other political contexts.131 In other words, cor-
porate constitutionalism uses constitutional values and
ideas as a source of inspiration for corporate governance,
instead of directly applying concepts from the constitu-
tional domain to the corporate governance domain.
4.2 Conceptual Differences
Table 1, without being exhaustive, highlights some of
the main conceptual differences between corporate law
& economics and corporate constitutionalism with
regard to corporate governance and corporate law in
general. Furthermore, the table makes reference to a
selection of authors that have engaged with each partic-
ular dichotomy. These general conceptual differences
are discussed in order to understand the differences in
shareholder role, as will be analysed in the next section.
4.2.1 Corporate Governance
Corporate law & economics is based upon an economic
model of corporate governance, while corporate consti-
129. See Rodrigues, above n. 122.
130. Bottomley, above n. 12, at 12.
131. Id.
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tutionalism is built upon a political governance model.132
The conceptual foundation of corporate governance is
in the economic model contract. In this model, the con-
tractual separation of corporate ownership from control
is at the heart of corporate governance.133 From the con-
tractual perspective, the firm134 serves as a nexus of con-
tracts (i.e. as a set of contracts among factors of produc-
tion).135 Corporate constitutionalism shifts the way of
thinking about corporate governance to the corporate
constitution. In this view, the corporation is not simply a
nexus of contracting relationships between individual
132. See on the distinction between an economic and political model of the
corporation M.A. Eisenberg, ‘Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct and Gov-
ernance – Two Models of the Corporation’, 17 Creighton Law Review 1
(1983). See further L.L. Dallas ‘Two Models of Corporate Governance:
Beyond Berle and Means’, 22 University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform 19 (1998), who advocates a ‘power model’ over the ‘efficiency
model’ of the corporation.
133. Jensen and Meckling, above n. 116 were in 1976 the first to translate
the separation of ownership and control in terms of a conflict of interest
(i.e. an agency problem) between management (i.e control as agent)
and shareholders (i.e. ownership as principal). However, they were not
the first who noticed the underlying problem of separation of owner-
ship from control. In their seminal article, Jensen and Meckling refer to
a quote of Adam Smith (1776): ‘The directors of such [joint-stock] com-
panies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money
than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a pri-
vate copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a
rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for
their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation
from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always pre-
vail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.’
One hundred and fifty-seven years after Adam Smith, A.A. Berle and
G.C. Means, above n. 124, at 311-312 popularised the concept of sep-
aration of ownership from control: ‘On the one hand, the owners of
passive property, by surrendering control and responsibility over the
active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation should
be operated in their sole interest. … At the same time, the controlling
groups, by means of the extension of corporate powers, have in their
own interest broken the bars of tradition which require that the corpo-
ration be operated solely for the benefit of the owners of passive prop-
erty.’
134. Note that economists speak about the ‘firm’, while lawyers refer to the
‘corporation’ or the ‘company’. These different terms indicate underly-
ing conceptual differences; see Bottomley, above n. 12, at 19. Lawyers
posit the corporation as a separate legal entity, while economists look
through the legal entity and see only a nexus of contracting relation-
ships.
corporate actors. Where contractual relationships are
aimed at maximising individual advantage, the constitu-
tion shifts the way of thinking to the coordination of
interactions136 for a collective purpose.137
4.2.2 Corporate Law
The two models of corporate governance lead to differ-
ent normative evaluation criteria for corporate law. The
evaluation criterion in the economic model is efficien-
cy.138 From this perspective, shareholder activism can
be viewed as a means to improve the governance or per-
formance of a firm through alleviating the agency prob-
lems (i.e. conflicts of interest between management and
shareholders) that arise on account of the separation of
135. Jensen and Meckling, above n. 116, at 310. Jensen and Meckling have
built on A.A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization’, 62 American Economic Review 5 (1972)
and the antecedents of their work are in R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the
Firm’, 4 Economica, New Series, 16 (1937).
136. See on ‘coordination interactions’ R. Hardin, ‘Why a Constitution?’, in
B. Grofman and D. Wittman (eds.) The Federalist Papers and the New
Institutionalism (1989), at 101.
137. Bottomley, above n. 12, at 13.
138. According to Kraakman et al., above n. 119, at 28-29, the overall
objective of corporate law is ‘to advance the aggregate welfare of all
who are affected by a firm’s activities, including the firm’s shareholders,
employees, suppliers, and customers, as well as third parties such as
local communities and beneficiaries of the natural environment. This is
what economists would characterize as the pursuit of overall social effi-
ciency’. And further, ‘We believe that this … view is – and surely ought
to be – the appropriate interpretation of statements by legal scholars
and economists asserting that shareholder value is the proper object of
corporate law.’ Or to put it bluntly in the words of Kaplow and Shavell,
above n. 11: ‘Our thesis is that social decisions should be based exclu-
sively on the welfare of individuals – and accordingly, should not
depend on notions of fairness, justice or cognate notions’ [emphasis in
original]. Although Kraakman et al. call their approach ‘functional’ they
admit that ‘it would perhaps be more accurate to call our approach
“economic” rather than “functional”, though the sometimes tenden-
tious use of economic argumentation in legal literature to support par-
ticular (generally laissez-faire) policy positions, as well as the tendency
in economic analysis to neglect non-pecuniary motivations or assume
an unrealistic degree of rationality in human action, have … caused
many scholars, – particularly outside the United States – to be as wary
of “economic analysis” as they are of “functional analysis”.’ See Kraak-
man et al., above n. 119, at 4. Their approach echoes that taken by
R.C. Clark, Corporate Law (1986), and Easterbrook and Fischel, above
n. 80 (1991).
Table 1 Conceptual differences in emphasis between corporate law & economics and corporate constitutionalism
Corporate law & economics Framework Corporate constitutionalism
– Economic Governance model (Eisenberg, 1983; Dal-
las, 1998)
– Political
– Contract Foundation of corporate governance
(Vanberg, 1992; Bottomley, 2007)
– Constitution
– Efficiency, welfare Goal of corporate law (Kaplow and Sha-
vell, 2002; Timmerman, 2007)
– Legitimacy, justice
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ownership and control in public corporations.139 Dis-
persed shareholdings of public corporations, resulting in
a separation of ownership and control, are regarded as
an efficient form of ownership, since the primary role of
shareholders is the provision of risk-bearing capital.140
The focus on efficiency is considered to advance overall
social welfare.141 This focus on the aggregate level is in
contrast to the corporate constitutional perspective,
which is concerned with justice and fairness in concrete
cases.142 Another conceptual difference related to the
goal of corporate law is that corporate law & economics
is focused on efficient outcomes, while corporate consti-
tutionalism, with its focus on legitimacy, is also con-
cerned with the (formal and informal) processes by
which these outcomes are reached.143 To give an exam-
ple, corporate constitutionalism emphasises the separa-
tion of powers between management, shareholders and
board of directors and procedures for hiring and firing
directors (i.e. procedural legitimacy).144 These kinds of
procedural aspects are regarded as constitutional con-
straints on corporations (much like a constitution places
side constraints on the legislature).145
The economic model of corporate governance leads to
an emphasis on the facilitative function of corporate law.
Mainstream corporate law & economics argues that cor-
porate law is designed principally to facilitate the organ-
isation of investor-owned corporations.146 By making
the corporate form ‘widely available and user-friendly
corporate law enables entrepreneurs to transact easily
through the medium of the corporate entity, and thus
lowers the costs of conducting business’.147 From the
facilitative perspective, corporate law consists of default
rules.148 Corporate law provides a standard form con-
tract, which gives corporate parties the freedom to adopt
or to deviate from the standard form.149 Furthermore,
the facilitative function of corporate law highlights that
139. See above n. 133 for further references to the separation of ownership
and control.
140. Fama, above n. 119.
141. Kraakman et al., above n. 119.
142. See, e.g., Timmerman (2007), above n. 11.
143. Bottomley, above n. 12.
144. Eisenberg (1983), above n. 132, at 3. According to Eisenberg, under
what he calls the Political Model, the corporation is ‘essentially a politi-
cal institution. The corporation’s legitimacy depends upon the extent to
which it is governed by principles appropriate to a democratic state
[emphasis added]’. And further, ‘the corporation is legitimated only if
its processes turn on democratic participation by … constituency groups
[emphasis added]’.
145. Coglianese, above n. 122, at 162 speaks of side constraints. See also K.
Heine, ‘Inside the black box: incentive regulation and incentive channel-
ing on energy markets’, Journal of Management and Governance 3
(2011).
146. Kraakman et al., above n. 119, at 14.
147. Id., at 2.
148. Id., at 20. In the 2004 edition of their book, Kraakman et al. speak of
‘off-the-shelf housekeeping rules’. See also Easterbrook and Fischel,
above n. 80.
149. Branson, above note 114, at 618 (2001) quotes an illustrative statement
of D.R. Fischel, ‘The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law’, 76 Northwest-
ern University Law Review 913, at 944 (1982) (‘Apart from minimizing
transaction costs and possibly facilitating the operation of market forces
that discipline management, corporation law has little role to play’).
individual shareholders are allowed to pursue their own
interests or goals.150 Corporate constitutionalism high-
lights the regulatory function of corporate law, which
puts more emphasis on the constraints that the constitu-
tion of the corporation entails.151 The constitutional
constraints are found in corporate law. In Dutch corpo-
rate law, the open norm of reasonableness and fairness
provides a prominent example of such a constitutional
constraint.152 This view highlights the importance of
having a corporate law that is constituted not only of
default rules but also of mandatory rules, in order to
protect the interests of corporate parties, such as share-
holders, creditors and employees.153
5 Comparative Analysis:
Shareholder Role
The conceptual differences between corporate law &
economics and corporate constitutionalism highlighted
in the previous section have implications for the way of
thinking about the shareholder role in corporate gover-
nance. These implications are summed up in Table 2.
5.1 Corporate Law & Economics
In the corporate law & economics framework, the share-
holder-as-investor role is emphasised.154 In a publicly
held corporation with dispersed shareholdings, share-
holder passivity is regarded as inevitable.155 From this
150. This principle also has a long tradition in case law, see, e.g., M. Meine-
ma, ‘Mandatory and Non-Mandatory Rules in Dutch Corporate Law’, 6
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 4 (2002).
151. V.J. Vanberg, ‘Organizations as Constitutional Systems’, 3 Constitution-
al Political Economy 2 (1992), at 243.
152. See, e.g., Dutch Corporate Governance Code, <http:// www .corpgov
.nl/document/ ?id=606> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013), at preamble no. 9
(2008) (‘[S]hareholders can give priority to their own interests with due
regard for the principle of reasonableness and fairness. The greater the
interest which the shareholder has in a company, the greater is his
responsibility to the company, the minority shareholders and other
stakeholders’). The principle of reasonableness and fairness is laid down
in Art. 2:8 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC). Recently, Wiek Slagter has
argued that not individual shareholders but only the general meeting of
shareholders is bound to the principle of reasonableness and fairness.
See W.J. Slagter, ‘De metamorfose van de aandeelhouder’, Nederlands
Juristenblad 1683 (2012). See for a different opinion J. Biesheuvel-Hoi-
tinga, A.A. Bootsma and H.M. Vletter-van Dort, ‘De Relatie tussen de
Raad van Commissarissen en Aandeelhouders(vergadering) bij Beurs-
vennootschappen’, Ondernemingsrecht 153-162 (2012), and the
response to Slagter by J.M. de Jongh, ‘Aandeelhouders Gebonden aan
Eisen van Redelijkheid en Billijkheid’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2099
(2012).
153. See for the Netherlands Art. 2:25 DCC. See also L. Timmerman (2004),
above n. 16.
154. Bottomley, above n. 12. See on different shareholder roles J. Hill,
‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder’, 48 The American Journal of
Comparative Law 39 (2000).
155. B.S. Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Reexamined’, 89 Michigan Law
Review 3 (1990), at 522 (‘Most modern corporate scholars, especially
those with a law-and-economics bent, accept shareholder passivity as
inevitable. They rely on market forces, especially takeovers, to limit
managerial discretion. The critics’ claim, stripped to its essentials, is that
shareholders don’t care much about voting except in extreme cases and
never will’).
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perspective, shareholders rely on market forces, such as
the market for corporate control, to discipline the agents
(i.e. management). Eugene Fama provides an example of
this view, which Black calls the ‘passivity story’:156
[P]ortfolio theory tells us that the optimal portfolio
for any investor is likely to be diversified across the
securities of many firms. Since he holds the securities
of many firms precisely to avoid having his wealth
depend too much on any one firm, an individual
security holder generally has no special interest in
personally overseeing the detailed activities in any
firm. ... Thus, although an individual security holder
may not have a strong interest in directly overseeing
the management of a particular firm, he has a strong
interest in the existence of the capital market which
efficiently prices the firm’s securities.157
The shareholder-as-investor role is related to an econom-
ic conception of share ownership. Share ownership is
viewed as nothing more than another contractual rela-
tionship among individuals within the nexus of con-
tracts that constitutes the firm.158 The metaphor of
ownership as a ‘bundle of rights’ is useful in this con-
text.159 The value of share ownership is only based on
the level of property rights held.160
The property rights of shareholders are created and
defined by legal rules.161 Shareholders own a relatively
small and well-defined subset of rights in public corpo-
rations.162 In this respect, three key rights are identified:
(i) the right to share in dividend payments and in distri-
156. Black (1990), above n. 155, at 522 (‘Collective action problems, which
arise because each shareholder owns a small fraction of a company’s
stock, explain why shareholders can’t be expected to care. I will call this
view the “passivity story”’).
157. Fama, above n. 119, at 291-292. In this quote, Fama refers to modern
portfolio theory and the efficient market hypothesis. See for an assess-
ment of these theories Winter (2011b), above n. 33.
158. Fama, above n. 119, Jensen and Meckling, above n. 116.
159. See already A. Corbin, ‘Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange’, 31
Yale Law Journal (1922), at 429 (‘Our concept of property has shifted
(…). “[P]roperty” has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at
all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations – rights, powers,
privileges, immunities.’ [emphasis in original]).
160. Sikavica and Hillman, above n. 97. See also Jensen and Meckling, above
n. 116, at 307 who focus on ‘the behavioral implications of the proper-
ty rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of
the firm [emphasis added]’.
161. D. Kang and A. Sorensen, ‘Ownership Organization and Firm Perform-
ance’, 25 Annual Review of Sociology (1999), at 126.
162. Sikavica and Hillman, above n. 97, at 8.
butions in liquidation of the corporation, (ii) the right to
vote (in particular upon the election of directors and
certain major corporate changes) and (iii) the right to
information (in the form of inspection of corporate
books and records).163
The economic conception of share ownership leads to a
narrow understanding of shareholder activism.
Although the rights of shareholders have increased in
recent years (i.e. shareholder empowerment),164 they
remain limited in scope. Shareholders will only engage
in shareholder activism to the extent they have specific
legal rights do to so (in accordance with the compliance
level of shareholder activism). From this perspective,
the focus is only on rights; shareholders owe the corpo-
ration no legal duties.165 Shareholders become active
only if they are financially rewarded for doing so. They
are at best reluctant activists.166 Shareholder influence,
if present, is indirect, and is mediated by their votes at
the shareholders meeting.167
5.2 Corporate Constitutionalism
From a corporate constitutional framework, the
shareholder is considered to be a member of the corpora-
tion.168 Membership entails ideas of participation, iden-
tity, responsibility and obligation.169 The role of share-
holder-as-member shifts from the external (market)
context to the internal (organisational) context. The
shareholder is part of a collective enterprise.170 Mem-
bership emphasises that the shareholder has not only a
formal role (e.g. voting) but also an informal role (e.g.
private negotiations with the corporation prior to the
shareholders’ meeting).
The membership role of shareholders can be linked to
psychological ownership, a concept introduced to organi-
163. Clark, above n. 138, at 13. See for a comparative analysis of these
rights Kraakman et al., above n. 119.
164. See for the Netherlands Arts. 2:107a, 2:114a, 2:118a, 2:135, 2:161a
DCC (Act of 9 July 2004, Stb. 2004, 370).
165. Anabtawi and Stout, above n. 30, at 4.
166. Pozen, above n. 60.
167. Sikavica and Hillman, above n. 97.
168. The idea of a membership relation can also be found in Dutch corporate
law. See, e.g., Van der Heijden/Van der Grinten, Handboek voor de
Naamloze en de Besloten Vennootschap (1992), No. 131, at 148-149,
and Van Schilfgaarde/Winter, Van de NV en de BV (2006), No. 1, at 2.
169. Bottomley, above n. 12.
170. Id.
Table 2 Shareholder role in corporate law & economics and corporate constitutionalism
Corporate law & economics Framework Corporate constitutionalism
– Investor Shareholder role (Hill, 2000; Bottomley,
2007)
– Member
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sation theory by Pierce and colleagues.171 Psychological
ownership is described as ‘a cognitive-affective state that
characterises the human condition’.172 It has been
argued that ownership can have an economic as well as a
psychological dimension at the same time.173 Sharehold-
ers with a high level of psychological ownership per-
ceive the corporation to be part of the self.174 In the lit-
erature, a model has been proposed that predicts the
form of activism (i.e. exit, voice, or loyalty) based on the
level of economic and psychological ownership of a
shareholder.175 Where the former type of ownership is
based on financial incentives and equips shareholders
with legal powers, the latter form of ownership deter-
mines the motivation of shareholders to act as owners of
the corporation.176 A high level of economic ownership
(the shareholder-as-investor) is associated with the exit
option, while a high level of psychological ownership
(the shareholder-as-member) is related to the voice
option for shareholders.
6 Integrated Analysis
It is not useful to choose the one theoretical framework
over the other. In order to understand shareholder acti-
vism in its full breadth and depth, the two frameworks
are combined. Corporations can be characterised as
political as much as economic institutions, corporate law
serves both to facilitate and to regulate corporate behav-
iour, shareholders are at the same time investors in and
members of the corporation, and so forth.
If we take a closer look, it becomes clear that the two
frameworks represent two ‘faces’ of the same ‘head’ (i.e.
the aforementioned Janus head of corporate law177). The
two faces represent equivalent aspects of the same reali-
171. J.L. Pierce, L. Van Dyne and L. Cummings, ‘Psychological Ownership: A
Construct Validation Study’, in M. Schanke (ed.), Proceedings of the
Southern Management Association (1992), J.L. Pierce, T. Kostova and
K. Dirks, ‘Toward a Theory of Psychological Ownership in Organiza-
tions’, 26 Academy of Management Review 2 (2001), and J.L. Pierce
and L. Rodgers, ‘The Psychology of Ownership and Worker-Owner
Productivity’, 29 Group and Organization Management 5 (2004).
172. J.L. Pierce, T. Kostova and K. Dirks, ‘The State of Psychological Owner-
ship: Integrating and Extending a Century of Research’, 7 Review of
General Psychology 1, at 84 (2003).
173. A. Etzioni, ‘The Socio-Economics of Property’, in F. W. Rudmin and C.
Madera (eds.), To Have Possessions, A Handbook on Ownership and
Property (1991), at 466 (Ownership is ‘a dual creation, part attitude,
part object, part in the “mind”, part real’).
174. Feike Sijbesma, CEO of Royal DSM NV, spoke on 8 November 2012 at
an Eumedion conference about ‘emotional’ share ownership. See for a
report from the conference <http:// www .eumedion .nl/ en/ news/
report_ from_ the_ eumedion_ conference_ _ _ know_ more_ of_ less_
companies_> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013).
175. Sikavica and Hillman, above n. 97.
176. Id.
177. See above n. 16 for further references on the Janus head of corporate
law.
ty.178 The literature provides a large number of illustra-
tions of the fact that the difference between the two
frameworks might be less than expected. For instance,
Jensen and Meckling give an example of the distinction
between property rights (highlighted by the corporate
law & economics framework) and human rights (high-
lighted by the corporate constitutional framework), by
stating that property rights in fact are human rights.179
Vanberg gives another example by perceiving the corpo-
rate constitution as a social contract.180 Hijink argues
that a certain level of protection of the interests of cor-
porate actors such as creditors and employees (i.e. the
regulatory function of corporate law highlighted by cor-
porate constitutionalism) is a precondition for a facilita-
tive corporate law (emphasised by law & economics).181
This section connects corporate law & economics – with
its emphasis on exit – and corporate constitutionalism –
with its emphasis on voice – by using the concept of loy-
alty. In Section 3, it has been mentioned that loyalty is
not just the intermediate variable between exit and voice
(i.e. loyalty as non-exit and non-voice). Loyalty deter-
mines the exit/voice mix. Loyalty has a psychological
dimension (i.e. the mental state of a shareholder feeling
attached to the corporation) and requires a long-term
and trusting relationship between the shareholder and
the corporation.
6.1 Importance of Corporate Law
The construction of loyalty as the variable that connects
exit and voice highlights the importance of corporate
law. In the introduction to this article, it was mentioned
that where exit is the domain of economists and voice is
the domain of political scientists, loyalty relates to the
legal domain. The intrinsic character of law demands
the balancing of diverging interests, which highlights a
long-term perspective. This long-term perspective in
the balancing of diverging interests can be found in the
UK, Dutch and US corporate law. Since 2006, the UK
Companies Act states that directors have a duty to pro-
mote the success of the corporation for the benefit of its
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard
(amongst other matters) to the likely consequences of
any decision in the long term.182 In the Netherlands,
178. See for an example of an eclectic approach from another discipline R.G
Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1959), at
159. The sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf puts it as follows: ‘[I]n sociology
(as opposed to philosophy) a decision which accepts one of these theo-
ries and rejects the other is neither necessary nor desirable. There are
sociological problems for the explanation of which the integration theo-
ry of society provides adequate assumptions; there are other problems
which can be explained only in terms of the coercion theory of society;
there are, finally, problems for which both theories appear adequate.
For sociological analysis, society is Janus-headed, and its two faces are
equivalent aspects of the same reality’.
179. Jensen and Meckling, above n. 116, at 307 (‘Property rights are of
course human rights, i.e., rights which are possessed by human beings.
The introduction of the wholly false distinction between property rights
and human rights in many policy discussions is surely one of the all time
great semantic flimflams’).
180. Vanberg, above n. 151.
181. Hijink, above n. 13.
182. See <http:// www .legislation .gov .uk/ ukpga/ 2006/ 46/ part/ 10/ data
.pdf> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013).
125
Bart Bootsma ELR November 2013 | No. 2
directors have a duty to act in the best interest of the
corporation and its enterprise, which is understood to
mean to act in the interest of all stakeholders.183 The
Dutch Corporate Governance Code, revised in 2008,
states that it is ‘based on the principle accepted in the
Netherlands that a company is a long-term alliance
between various parties involved in the company’ and
emphasises that directors have a responsibility to weigh
these various interests, with a view to ‘ensuring the con-
tinuity of the enterprise, while the company endeavours
to create long-term shareholder value’.184 Even in the
US, most states permit directors to consider the inter-
ests of constituencies other than shareholders, and
under Delaware law, directors have wide leeway to act
in the long-term best interests of shareholders, even if
that does not increase shareholder value in the short
term.185 In the long term, the interests of shareholders
and other constituencies of the corporations appear to
converge.186
Corporate law thus requires directors to take a long-
term perspective in their corporate actions. Feike Sij-
besma, CEO of Royal DSM NV, a Dutch-based multi-
national life sciences and materials sciences company,
describes the function of a corporation (and its CEO) in
terms of the triple bottom line 'people', 'planet', and
'profit'.187 This is an interesting metaphor, as these three
pillars to a certain extent correlate with shareholder acti-
vism in terms of the triad exit, voice and loyalty. Just as
there has to be a balance between exit, voice and loyalty,
the idea of the triple bottom line is that corporations
need to attain a certain level of performance (i.e. the
bottom line) in all three areas of people, planet and prof-
it.188 Corporations have to strive for economic prosperi-
ty (i.e. profit), with due regard to the ecological (i.e.
planet) and societal (i.e. people) impact of their actions.
It will be clear that profit relates to the law & economics
framework. Planet can be linked to the corporate consti-
tutional framework, as it is concerned with how the out-
come profit is reached. The ecological and societal
183. See Arts. 2:129 and 2:140 DCC. See also Van Bekkum et al., above n.
47, at 4 and the ABN AMRO case, above n. 54.
184. See Dutch Corporate Governance Code, above n. 152, at 6.
185. M.J. Roe, ‘Delaware’s Politics’, 118 Harvard Law Review 2491, at
2525-2526 (2005), and Strine, above n. 25. The most prominent Dela-
ware decision to this effect is Paramount Communications v. Time Inc.,
571.
186. The long-term enlightened shareholder value perspective is regarded as
a 'third way', which merges shareholder and stakeholder elements. See,
e.g., C.A. Williams and J.M. Conley, ‘An Emerging Third Way?: The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct’, UNC
Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 04-09 (2004).
187. See, e.g., Sijbesma in his blog for the World Economic Forum, ‘On the
evolution of business’, <http:// forumblog .org/ 2012/ 09/ on -the -
evolution -of -business/ > (last visited 31 Jan. 2013). The reference to
Royal DSM NV is not accidental, as this corporation proposed a loyalty
dividend, see infra Section 7.
188. The Triple Bottom Line originates from J. Elkington, Cannibalswith
Forks: the Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business (1997). The tri-
ad ‘people, planet, profit’ was first coined by Elkington in 1995. Royal
Dutch Shell adopted it as the title of its first sustainability report in
1997.
impact of corporate actions can be viewed as constitu-
tional constraints on profit.189
The balance between exit- and voice-related activities of
shareholders is determined by corporate law. The term
corporate law is used here in a broad sense, including
securities regulation law, tax law and so on. Regulation
of shareholder activism has been developed within the
(mainstream) law & economics framework, which puts
considerable emphasis on the exit option for sharehold-
ers. In the literature, it is stated that regulation is based
on the idea that ‘there is no such thing as too much liq-
uidity, too much trading, or too much volatility’.190 For
the purpose of risk diversification, the legal framework
compels shareholders to diversify their portfolios, which
has led to ‘an investment policy that is not focused on an
actual understanding of individual companies, but on
more or less following the market’.191 At this point, I
recall the aforementioned citation of Fama.192 Consis-
tent with this legal framework, shareholders have diver-
sified their portfolios in large numbers.193
Tax law is also able to influence the exit/voice mix. For
instance, in most countries short-term trading is subject
to higher capital gains tax rates than long-term investing
is, which discourages the exit option.194 Another much-
discussed example includes a small tax on the selling of
shares, referred to as the securities transaction tax or
Tobin Tax. The idea of such a tax is also that it puts a
brake on exit.195
Recently, the Dutch Parliament adopted new corporate
governance rules (the Act Frijns), which entered into
force on 1 July 2013.196 Although the exact issues with
this act go beyond the purview of this article, the act
provides a prominent example of the influence of corpo-
rate law on the voice option for shareholders. One of the
key changes with regard to the Act is raising the thresh-
old for the right of shareholders to submit items for the
agenda of the general meeting from 1% to 3%. This
189. See on constitutional constraints above n. 145.
190. Fox and Lorsch, above n. 95, at 52.
191. Winter (2011b), above n. 33, at 6. Winter refers to the US Uniform
Prudent Investor Act of 1995, <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
fnact99/1990s/upia94.pdf> (last visited 31 Jan. 2013), and the EU Pen-
sion Directive (Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institu-
tions for occupational retirement provision), and EU Solvency II Direc-
tive (Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the busi-
ness of Insurance and Reinsurance).
192. See Section 5, above n. 157.
193. Winter (2011b), above n. 33, at 4 mentions some figures of large insti-
tutional shareholders (‘The huge Norwegian state fund Norges Bank
invests in 8,300 listed companies worldwide, the Californian pension
fund Calpers invests in more than 7,700 companies, and the Dutch
pension fund managers APG and PGGM each invest in more than
4,000 listed companies’).
194. See Fox and Lorsch, above n. 95.
195. See, e.g., Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 9 (‘The financial transac-
tion tax … is partly motivated by this aspiration to curb speculation’)
and Fox and Lorsch, above n. 95, at 52 (‘the possibility that [a financial
transaction tax] would decrease liquidity should not be seen as a slam-
dunk argument against it’). A financial transaction tax was already pro-
posed by John Maynard Keynes, see J.M. Keynes, The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), at 105.
196. Act of 15 November 2012, Stb. 2012, 588.
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change will have the effect of discouraging the voice
option for shareholders as it becomes more difficult to
submit items for the agenda. Furthermore, the Act
introduces a regulation on the identification of share-
holders of listed corporations. This change is aimed at
enabling communication with shareholders prior to
their general meeting (i.e. a measure aimed at stimulating
shareholder voice).
It may seem counterintuitive to at the same time intro-
duce measures which discourage and stimulate share-
holder voice. The first measure, raising the threshold to
submit items for the agenda, is a direct effect of the
ABN AMRO case,197 in which hedge fund TCI, after
acquiring only 1 or 2% of the shares of ABN AMRO,
set in motion a string of events that ultimately led to a
bailout of ABN AMRO by the Dutch government. In
terms of Hirschman’s model, the measure of raising the
threshold from 1% to 3% is directed against ‘faux’ voice
(i.e. the intervention level of shareholder activism),
while the measure of enabling communication with
shareholders is aimed at the ‘true’ voice (i.e. the stew-
ardship level of shareholder activism).198
6.2 Interaction Between Exit, Voice and Loyalty
The interaction between exit, voice and loyalty is illus-
trated in Figure 1. The boxes for exit, voice and loyalty
have the same size and distance, which demonstrates
that they are viewed as equally important. Loyalty is
depicted at the top of the figure, as it influences both
exit and voice. Furthermore, the figure makes reference
to the underlying theoretical frameworks of corporate
law & economics and corporate constitutionalism, both
of which are used to analyse corporate law. Corporate
law & economics and corporate constitutionalism are
regarded as two different ‘lenses’ that look at the same
reality.199 Each lens has a different emphasis, which
results in different policy implications. An exclusive
focus on corporate law & economics underemphasises
corporate constitutional aspects and vice versa.
197. Supreme Court of the Netherlands 13 July 2007, JOR 2007/178 (ABN
AMRO).
198. See Section 3.
199. Bottomley, above n. 12.
An exclusive focus on any one of these perspectives can
have detrimental societal effects. It is recognised that
the private constitutional contract (corporate gover-
nance) and the public constitutional contract (corporate
law) remain incomplete.200 Corporate governance and
corporate law leave discretionary room to decision mak-
ers. Directors can use this discretionary room in their
own interest, which might not be in the interest of the
shareholders, the corporation or society at large.201 The
disciplinary mechanisms based on the law & economics
framework, such as the market for corporate control, are
not able to prevent governance and financial crises, as
mentioned in Section 2.
However, it must be considered that a certain level of
discretion is necessary to facilitate entrepreneurship.202
Managerial discretion is needed to innovate and to be
able to respond quickly to changing economic circum-
stances.203 These elements might be lost if corporate law
and governance become overly focused on legitimacy on
the basis of corporate constitutionalism. Governments,
for instance, are often criticised for their ‘sluggishness
and gridlock’.204 I agree with Coglianese that ‘few pro-
ponents of current corporate governance reforms would
advocate making corporations fully as rule-bound and
democratically open as government is’.205
On the basis of the eclectic approach, I would argue for
a balance between corporate law & economics and cor-
porate constitutional considerations. In the terminology
of Hirschman, there is a need for a balance between exit
and voice. Loyalty is the instrument to influence the
exit/voice mix. Corporate law is not able to prescribe an
200. Easterbrook and Fischel, above n. 80, H. Hansmann, ‘Corporation and
Contract’, 8 American Law and Economics Review 1-19 (2006), and
Heine, above n. 145.
201. Heine, above n. 145.
202. See, e.g., Assink, above n. 16.
203. Coglianese, above n. 122.
204. In this respect, Coglianese refers to J. Rauch, Demosclerosis: The Silent
Killer of American Government (1995). See Coglianese, above n. 122,
at 167.
205. Coglianese, above n. 122, at 167.
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optimal mix for exit and voice.206 However, corporate
law can facilitate loyalty-promoting instruments, which
are analysed in the next section from a corporate law &
economics and corporate constitutional perspective.
7 Loyalty-Promoting
Instruments
7.1 Loyalty Dividend and Loyalty Warrants
This final paragraph bundles the insights from previous
sections to analyse loyalty-promoting instruments for
shareholders in corporate law, such as loyalty dividends
and loyalty warrants. Several French listed corporations
make use of a loyalty dividend (prime de fidélité) for their
long-term shareholders.207 In the Netherlands, Royal
DSM made a proposal to amend its articles of associa-
tion at the annual general meeting of 2007 in order to
introduce a loyalty dividend.208 The proposal resulted in
a legal case. Although DSM decided to withdraw the
proposal to avoid a years-long conflict with a group of
its shareholders, the Netherlands Supreme Court ruled
‘in the interest of the law’ that it is legally possible to
introduce a loyalty dividend.209
In the literature, loyalty warrants have been proposed as
a more flexible instrument compared with loyalty divi-
dend.210 The idea of these instruments is that share-
holders who hold their shares for a certain period of
time (i.e. the loyalty period) are rewarded with a finan-
cial incentive, which could take the form of an addition-
206. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2, at 124 (‘[A] word of caution is now nee-
ded about what our approach cannot yield: it does not come out with a
firm prescription for some optimal mix of exit or voice, nor does it wish
to accredit the notion that each institution requires its own mix that
could be gradually approached by trial and error. At any point of time,
it is possible to say that there is a deficiency of one or the other of our
two mechanisms; but it is very unlikely that one could specify a most
efficient mix of the two that would be stable over time. The reason is
simple: each recovery mechanism is itself subject to the forces of decay
which have been invoked here all along. This is so not just to add a
final touch of philosophical consistency, but for more mundane reasons
as well. As has already been mentioned, the short-run interest of man-
agement in organizations is to increase its own freedom of movement;
management will therefore strain to strip the members-customers of the
weapons they can wield, be they exit or voice, and to convert, as it
were, what should be a feedback into a safety valve’ [emphasis in origi-
nal]).
207. Some examples include Air Liquide, Credit Agricole, Electricité de
France and L’Oreal. See for the legal regime article L232-14 of the
French Code de Commerce.
208. The aim of the loyalty dividend proposal was twofold: (i) create an
incentive for shareholders who intend to keep their shares longer term
(reward long-term shareholders) and (ii) improve the direct communica-
tion with these long-term shareholders.
209. See for the DSM case above n. 22. See further M.L. Lennarts and M.S.
Koppert-van Beek, ‘Loyalty Dividend and the EC Principle of Equal
Treatment of Shareholders’, 4 European Company Law, 173-180
(2008).
210. See Bolton and Samama, above n. 7. The instrument is also discussed in
P.E. Masouros, Corporate Law and Economic Stagnation, How Share-
holder Value and Short-termism Contribute to the Decline of Western
Economies (2012), at 311-312, and A.A. Bootsma, ‘L-warrants’, in G.J.
Meijer, P.M. Storm and L. Timmerman (eds.), Piet Sanders: een Hon-
derdjarige Vernieuwer (2012), at 37-40.
al dividend for the loyal shareholder or the form of a
warrant attached to the share. Just like a share option, a
warrant gives the right to purchase a pre-determined
number of shares in the corporation at a pre-specified
price. The dividend or warrant is granted to loyal share-
holders on the expiration of the loyalty period, for
instance a period of three years.211
7.2 Eclectic Approach
The corporate law & economics and corporate constitu-
tional framework highlight different aspects of loyalty
dividend and loyalty warrants. From a corporate law &
economics perspective, the loyalty-promoting instru-
ments are regarded with suspicion. It is highlighted that
the instruments can be used for intentions other than
their initial purpose of stimulating loyalty.212 For
instance, some authors have regarded the financial
incentives as a ‘stealthy’ defensive measure to protect
the board against a hostile takeover.213 Long-term
shareholders would have an incentive to vote against a
takeover of the corporation they invest in, in an effort to
hold on their loyalty-promoting dividend or warrants.
Another aspect emphasised from the law & economics
framework is that the instruments are sensitive to abuse
by investors. Capital market developments have allowed
investors to readily decouple legal share ownership from
the economic interest attached to the shares.214 This
decoupling makes it possible for shareholders who have
no economic interest in the share to be registered for a
loyalty dividend or warrant.
We must not ignore these objections to loyalty-promot-
ing instruments. However, much will depend on their
concrete implementation. With regard to the effect of
loyalty warrants on the functioning of the market for
corporate control, it should be noted that if a corpora-
tion underperforms, this will result in a decline in share
price. In that case, the warrants will become ‘out-of-the-
money’ (i.e. a strike price for the warrant that is higher
than the price of the underlying share). The shareholder
who was entitled to a loyalty warrant would then no lon-
ger have an incentive to hold the shares until the loyalty
period expired.215 The loyalty of a shareholder who is
entitled to a warrant thus is not unlimited or blind. Fur-
thermore, the DSM case provides a possible solution
with regard to shareholder abuse of loyalty dividend.
The DSM board of directors was given a discretionary
211. A loyalty period of three years is used in France, and was also proposed
by DSM. However, the loyalty period could be shorter or longer,
depending on the particular circumstances of the corporation and its
shareholders. See also Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 10.
212. This line of thinking is captured well by Schouten, above n. 103. In Sec-
tion 3, I have already argued that this is only one side of the story. 'Loy-
alty' is also regarded as a precondition for 'voice'.
213. Nieuwe Weme and Van Solinge have discussed loyalty dividend as a
new kind of defensive measure, see Nieuwe Weme and Van Solinge,
above n. 42, at 220, and Paul Frentrop compared loyalty dividend to
depository receipts for shares, see Tali and De Graaf, above n. 91.
214. See, e.g., H.T.C. Hu and B.S. Black, ‘The New Vote Buying: Empty Vot-
ing and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership’, 79 Southern California Law
Review, at 811 (2006).
215. See Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 33-34 for the possible treat-
ment of L-warrants in the case of a takeover.
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power to deregister shareholders who were suspected of
misusing the instrument.216
Financial instruments such as loyalty dividend and loy-
alty warrants start from the (corporate law & economics-
based) premise that incentives matter.217 The invest-
ment behaviour of shareholders is based on short-term
profit maximisation.218 If we want long-term sharehold-
er engagement to be more than rhetoric – or in the
words of Adolf Berle, more than ‘a pious wish that
something nice will come out of it’219 – the incentives of
shareholders should be directed to the long term.220
Although the instruments start from the premise that
incentives matter, they do not fit particularly well in law
& economics–based agency theory.221 In fact, the agent
(management) determines the desired (i.e. loyal) behav-
iour of the principal (shareholders). Some authors have
questioned the normative neutrality of presenting the
relationship between shareholders and management of
the corporation as an agency relationship.222 Deciding
who is to be regarded as the agent and who as the prin-
cipal is already not normatively neutral.223 According to
Heath, in agency theory the principal is understood as
‘the one whose welfare ought to be served by the agent’
(i.e. the managers ought to serve the interest of the
shareholders).224 From a corporate constitutional per-
spective, the company is not viewed as a nexus of con-
tracts (i.e. the ‘firm’) but as a separate legal entity (i.e.
the ‘corporation’). Management of the corporation has
to take into account not only the interests of sharehold-
ers but also those of other constituencies. From this per-
spective, the introduction of loyalty-promoting instru-
ments is less problematic, as management acts as repre-
216. See for the DSM case above n. 22.
217. Kay Review, above n. 1, at 5 (2012) (‘Incentives matter: not because, as
some people crudely think, financial rewards are the only human moti-
vating – although there are some people of whom that is true, and
many of them are to be found in the financial sector’); Advocate-Gen-
eral Timmerman makes a similar point in his conclusion regarding the
DSM case, above n. 22, at 3.58.
218. S. Wong, ‘Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Invest-
ors’, Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (2010), at 406,
Winter (2011b), above n. 33, at 9, and Walker Review, above n. 28, at
69.
219. A.A. Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note’, 45
Harvard Law Review (1932), at 1368.
220. See, e.g., Sikavica and Hillman, above n. 97 who argue that the impor-
tance and priority attached to the long term is a result of shareholders’
psychological ownership. See Winter (2011b), above n. 33, at 13
(2011b) for the link between shareholder 'stewardship' and a long-term
perspective. See Bolton and Samama, above n. 7 for the relevance of
alignment between the long-term horizon of the board and the share-
holders.
221. For loyalty dividend, this was also recognised by F. Lute at the Eume-
dion seminar of 14 February 2007. The outcomes of this seminar are
summarised in Tali and De Graaf, above n. 91. I have the papers of this
seminar on file.
222. E.g., J. Heath, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory’, 19 Business
Ethics Quarterly 4 (2009), at 505 (‘Jensen and Meckling present this as
though it were purely an empirical observation – a “positive” claim
about the structure of the firm, not a “normative” claim about how the
firm should be organized. Yet it is not clear that describing a particular
relationship as a “principal-agent” relationship can ever be normatively
neutral’).
223. Id.
224. Heath, above n. 222, at 505-506.
sentative of the corporation, which is a broader role than
serving the interests of shareholders.
It has been argued that loyalty-promoting instruments –
granted with the ‘right’ motives – are not objectionable
in themselves.225 These motives are to be found in the
corporate constitutional framework. In the terminology
of Hirschman,226 financial incentives for shareholders
are intended to stimulate loyalty, in order to change the
exit/voice mix in favour of voice. The incentives are an
instrument to promote the stewardship level of share-
holder activism (in the terminology of Winter) or to cre-
ate more dedicated shareholders (in the terminology of
Porter).227 In terms of share ownership types, the
instruments try to stimulate a shift from economic own-
ership (i.e. the shareholder-as-investor) to psychological
ownership (i.e. the shareholder-as-member).228
Financial incentives for shareholders are regarded as a
private (market) solution to a problem of public
interest.229 After the governance and financial crisis, the
inability of institutional shareholders to become truly
engaged shareholders in the long term has proven to be
a fundamental corporate governance problem. As Win-
ter points out, regulation is not able to address this
underlying problem.230 He states,
A key challenge of regulation, in general, but certain-
ly in response to a crisis, is to distinguish which prob-
lems can be meaningfully addressed by new regula-
tion and which problems cannot. A bigger challenge
still is to act on this distinction and to have the cour-
age not to regulate the latter problems but to seek dif-
ferent avenues of addressing them.231
Loyalty-promoting instruments can be viewed as just
such a ‘different avenue’. The instruments provide a
less radical and more flexible solution to the overempha-
sis on shareholder exit and an underemphasis on share-
holder voice. The instruments are less radical than
changes in the law, which require major interventions in
capital markets (e.g. the aforementioned financial trans-
action tax).232 Furthermore, the instruments are more
flexible, as corporate law only facilitates its introduction.
The exact parameters of the instrument (e.g. the length
of the loyalty period and the size of the dividend or
strike price of the warrant) can be left completely or
within certain legal boundaries up to the corporation,
dependent on the particular circumstances of the corpo-
ration and its shareholder base. Based on the eclectic
approach, the instruments combine the best of both
worlds, by providing a law & economics-based financial
225. R.H. Maatman, ‘Integriteit van de Onderneming: Aandeelhouder en
Integriteit’, in I.P. Asscher-Vonk (ed.), Onderneming en Integriteit
(2007), at 86.
226. Hirschman (1970), above n. 2.
227. Winter (2011b), above n. 33, and Porter, above n. 48.
228. Sikavica and Hillman, above n. 97, and Bottomley, above n. 12.
229. Maatman, at the Eumedion seminar, see Tali and De Graaf, above n.
91.
230. Winter (2011a), above n. 32, at 14.
231. Id.
232. Bolton and Samama, above n. 7, at 10.
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incentive to loyal shareholders in order to activate a true
shareholder voice (i.e. a corporate constitutional
motive).
8 Conclusion
In this article, Hirschman’s model of exit, voice and loy-
alty has been used to analyse the corporate governance
role of shareholders in public corporations. Although
Hirschman wrote the original work Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty more than forty years ago, the concepts are still
very useful in the context of corporate governance.
Applying Hirschman’s model to shareholder activism
exposes an excessive focus of shareholders on exit,
which is accompanied by under-emphasising sharehold-
er voice.233
Loyalty is regarded as the critical variable, which medi-
ates between exit and voice. In this article, the long-
term and psychological dimension of loyalty has been
highlighted. I have suggested that instruments that
intend to stimulate loyal share ownership, such as loyal-
ty dividend and loyalty warrants, should be assessed as
instruments that may influence the balance between exit
and voice in favour of the voice option for shareholders.
In the literature, this function of loyalty is not always
recognised.
As regards loyalty-promoting instruments, several les-
sons are learned from revisiting Hirschman’s model.
The first and second are taken directly from Hirschman.
The third and fourth mentioned here are regarded as
additions to Hirschman’s model.
First, it is important to realise that every shareholder
response has a shady side, which I have referred to as
faux exit and faux voice. The shady side of loyalty is
that it becomes unlimited or blind. In this case, loyalty
no longer activates voice, but represses exit and voice.
This lesson has to be taken into account in the concrete
implementation of loyalty-promoting instruments.234
Second, in one of his later works, Hirschman has
improved the model by complicating the assumption
that at a given point all members of an organisation
would exhibit the same level of loyalty.235 He intro-
duced Ausreiser (with a low level of loyalty) and Bleiber
(with a high level of loyalty). In the context of corporate
governance, these types can be translated to short-term
speculators and buy-and-hold investors, respectively.
This complication of the model is important, as it draws
attention to the particular shareholder characteristics of
the corporation. Introducing loyalty-promoting instru-
ments will be most relevant for corporations with a large
base of Ausreiser shareholders, which resort to exit. For
such a corporation, the introduction of a loyalty divi-
dend or loyalty warrant could result in a group of stable,
233. This analysis has recently been confirmed by the Kay Review, above n.
1.
234. See above n. 215 for the ability of loyalty warrants to cope with this
problem.
235. Hirschman (1992), above n. 90.
long-term shareholders, thereby creating a better bal-
ance between short-term speculators (i.e. liquidity) and
buy-and-hold investors (i.e. stability).236 For a corpora-
tion with a founding or family business shareholder,
there might be less reason to introduce loyalty-promot-
ing instruments.237
The third lesson refers to the time horizon of corporate
directors and shareholders. It is important that align-
ment exists between the time horizon of corporate direc-
tors and shareholders. It has been argued that measures
that induce a more long-term orientation for corporate
directors will only prove effective if they are accompa-
nied by a long-term focus for shareholders. For share-
holders, loyalty-promoting instruments try to induce a
shift to the long term.
A fourth and final lesson is the importance of corporate
law in relation to Hirschman’s loyalty. Where exit is
related to a corporate law & economics framework and
voice to a corporate constitutional framework, loyalty is
related to corporate law. Corporate law balances the
diverging corporate law & economics and corporate con-
stitutional considerations. Several examples have been
provided on the influence of corporate law (in a broad
sense) on the exit/voice mix. Loyalty-promoting instru-
ments, which can be facilitated by corporate law, pro-
vide long-term shareholders with corporate law & eco-
nomics-based financial incentives. The instruments are
based on corporate constitutional considerations and are
intended to promote the stewardship level of sharehold-
er activism and to create more dedicated shareholders.
The instruments try to facilitate a shift from economic
ownership (i.e. the shareholder-as-investor) to psycho-
logical ownership (i.e. the shareholder-as-member).
In summary, the eclectic approach to loyalty-promoting
instruments for shareholders has demonstrated that (i)
the corporate law & economics and corporate constitu-
tional framework highlight different aspects of the same
reality (as a representation of the Janus head of corpo-
rate law); (ii) it is possible to combine the two frame-
works in an eclectic analysis of loyalty-promoting
instruments; and (iii) the eclectic approach leads to a
more complete understanding of loyalty-promoting
instruments than a one-sided analysis based solely on
corporate law & economics or corporate constitutional-
ism.
236. See for a similar point J.M. de Jongh, ‘Loyaal aan Duurzame Waarde-
creatie’, Ondernemingsrecht (2010), 152 (in response to Schouten,
2010, above n. 103).
237. Think also of the case of transacting firms as discussed by Fried, above
n. 44.
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